In Gray v. Onondaga-Cortland-Madison Boces, 16-973, 2018 WL 1804694 (N.D.N.Y. April 13, 2018), the court held that plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim did not sufficiently allege that claim.
The court explained the procedural framework for evaluating the sufficiency of claims in federal complaints:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” It is well-settled that “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his [or her] entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Rule 8(a)(2) “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). And a complaint must do more than “tender[ ] ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). It “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
The court summarized the substantive law:
Pursuant to EEOC regulations[,]
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual’s employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11. In determining whether conduct constitutes sexual harassment in violation of Title VII, a court may look to “the nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred.” Id. The impermissible character of the underlying conduct must be stated in order to permit an inference that it rises to the level of sexual harassment.
Applying the law, the court explained:
Here, the complaint merely concludes that Gray “was … sexually harassed” by students in her classroom, (Compl. ¶¶ 19, 24), and vaguely describes the students’ conduct as “unceasing, pervasive[,] and outrageous in nature,” (id. ¶ 20), but omits any factual allegations regarding the students’ conduct that allegedly constituted sexual harassment, (see generally Compl.). And the court cannot reasonably infer whether such unidentified conduct constituted sexual harassment merely from allegations relating to Gray’s resulting injury, (id. ¶ 27), or OCM BOCES’ response upon learning of such conduct, (id. ¶¶ 12, 26, 28-29).6 Moreover, “[d]efendants cannot be required to respond, and be held to those responses in future litigation, where the factual … allegations remain so unclear.” Castiglione v. Papa, No. 1:09–CV–0967, 2010 WL 2044688, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. May 24, 2010), aff’d, 423 Fed.Appx. 10 (2d Cir. 2011); (Dkt. No. 8 at 2 ¶ 6.) In sum, Gray cannot affix a conclusory label of “sexual harassment” on unspecified conduct without alleging facts that, if accepted as true, allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that OCM BOCES is liable. See Iqbal,556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57. As such, Gray’s sexual harassment claim is dismissed.
While the court dismissed the plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim, it declined – without elaboration/explanation – to dismiss plaintiff disability discrimination and retaliation claims.