“Clever men may easily conceal their motivations.”
Thus writes the Second Circuit in a recent case, Khanna v. MUFG Union Bank, N.A., 2019 WL 6127418 (2d Cir. Nov. 19, 2019) (Summary Order), in which the court vacated the district court’s dismissal – under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) – of plaintiff’s race and gender discrimination claims asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the New York State Human Rights Law.
This principle is especially at play in these types of cases, where discrimination is proven indirectly/through circumstantial evidence.
The court summarized the basic legal framework for pleading these claims:
[I]n an employment discrimination case, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the employer took adverse action against [her] and (2) [her] race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the employment decision.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 86 (2d Cir. 2015) (referencing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). A plaintiff may plausibly allege that race or gender was a motivating factor by alleging “facts that indirectly show discrimination by giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination.” Id. at 87. “It is well-settled that an inference of discriminatory intent may be derived from a variety of circumstances, including … the more favorable treatment of employees not in the protected group….” Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 584 F.3d 487, 502 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Vill. of Freeport v. Barrella, 814 F.3d 594, 601 n.9 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Of course, the fact that an employer favored someone outside of the relevant protected class will ordinarily suffice to sustain an inference of discrimination.”
Applying the law, the court explained:
Here, the District Court held that Khanna failed to allege facts sufficient to give rise plausibly to the inference that her race or gender was the source of Nolen’s treatment of her: “While it is true that many industries are dominated by white men, being out-numbered or the lone minority in an office setting is not enough, without more, to give rise to a gender or race-based discrimination claim.” Khanna v. MUFG Union Bank, N.A., No. 18-CV-3031 (ALC), 2019 WL 1428435, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2019). The District Court’s conclusion overlooks Khanna’s claims that she was treated less favorably than her white male coworkers. Khanna alleged that she was provided fewer resources, given fewer responsibilities, and held to a higher standard than her white male coworkers. Khanna also alleged that Nolen spoke to her in a patronizing manner and was pleasant and personable to her white male colleagues. For example, in a meeting about Khanna’s work performance, Nolen reminded Khanna in a condescending tone that she should say “please” and “thank you” at all times. Khanna further alleges that she was replaced by a white male the day after her termination.