In Reppert v. New York State Department of State, 19-cv-01518, 2020 WL 4346932 (N.D.N.Y. July 28, 2020), the court, inter alia, dismissed plaintiff’s race discrimination claim asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Initially, the court explained the well-established law:
Because discrimination claims implicate an employer’s usually unstated intent and state of mind, rarely is there ‘direct, smoking gun, evidence of discrimination.’ ” Vega, 801 F.3d at 86 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Richards v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 668 F. Supp. 259, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff’d, 842 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1988)). “[A]t the initial stage of a litigation,” therefore, “the plaintiff’s burden is ‘minimal’—he need only plausibly allege facts that provide ‘at least minimal support for the proposition that the employer was motivated by discriminatory intent.
However, it concluded that plaintiff did not sufficiently allege that his employer was motivated by discriminatory intent:
Plaintiff alleges that “racist behavior began” with his “supervisor Stephen Ridler in about 2006” and “[h]arassment continued” during his employment. (Dkt. No. 18, at 6). He further alleges that “[r]ecent events have provided evidence of discrimination in pre-determining promotions,” (id. at 3), and that DOS used “differing candidate selection standards to disfavor his candidacy.” (Id.). These allegations, however, lack specificity and are conclusory; thus, they allow no inference of discriminatory intent. Conclusory allegations of “racist behavior,” without any supporting facts, are not sufficient; the Court must “instead assess whether the facts [Plaintiff] has pleaded provide ‘at least minimal support for the proposition that [his] employer was motivated by discriminatory intent.’ ” Williams v. Classic Security, No. 18-cv-1691, 2019 WL 4511953, at *5, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160217, at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2019) (quoting Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 311) (dismissing the plaintiff’s racial discrimination claims where complaint did not include “facts sufficient to support the inference that racial discrimination was a motivating factor behind [his] termination”); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s discrimination claim is granted.
For the same reason, the court also dismissed plaintiff’s hotwile work environment claim, citing the principle that a plaintiff ““must make some non-conclusory allegation that suggests that the conduct that is the basis of the hostile work environment was as a result of her race or skin color.”