In Ali-Hasan, M.D. v. St. Peter’s Health Partners Medical Associates, P.C. et al, 2023 WL 7320860 (2d Cir. Nov. 7, 2023), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s award of summary judgment to the defendants on plaintiff’s sex discrimination asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
In sum, plaintiff was terminated from his position after defendants received an anonymous complaint allegedly accusing him of sex discrimination. Plaintiff contended that defendants failed to adequately address the complaint, exhibited bias against him due to his sex, used “the mere existence of such an accusation as justification to fire him,” and “denied him any modicum of due process in the investigative and adjudicative processes that led to his termination.”
In assessing plaintiff’s claim, the court applied the three-step burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, which it described as follows:
Under that framework, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of demonstrating that: (1) he was within the protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. If the plaintiff satisfies those requirements, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action. If the defendant does so, the plaintiff is no longer entitled to a presumption of discrimination, but may still prevail by showing that the employer’s determination was in fact the result of [the prohibited] discrimination. [Cleaned up.]
The court held that plaintiff failed to meet his prima facie burden because he did not present sufficient evidence as to elements 2 (qualification) and 4 (inference of discrimination).
As to the “qualification” element:
Ali-Hasan was required to present evidence from which a jury could find that he “met the defendant’s criteria for the position,” Williams v. R.H. Donnelley, Corp., 368 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 2004). Ali-Hasan’s employment agreement, which was in effect at the times of his hiring and his termination, designates board certification in interventional cardiology as a qualification for the position. Yet, Ali-Hasan was not board certified in interventional cardiology at any point during his employment. Ali-Hasan’s assertion that he was qualified irrespective of this contractual requirement is insufficient to raise an issue for trial, as “[w]hether job performance was satisfactory depends on the employer’s criteria for the performance of the job—not the standards that may seem reasonable to the jury or judge.
As to the “inference of discrimination” element:
Next, even assuming that a reasonable jury could find that Ali-Hasan was qualified, his prima facie case still fails on the fourth prong, i.e., whether the circumstances of the adverse employment action Ali-Hasan suffered give rise to an inference of sex discrimination. Ali-Hasan’s attempt to rely on our precedent in Menaker v. Hofstra University is unavailing in these circumstances. In that case, the plaintiff was terminated from his position at Hofstra University after the university received a letter from a female student accusing the plaintiff of sexual harassment. Determining that the only issue on appeal was the fourth element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, we held that “where a university (1) takes an adverse action against a student or employee, (2) in response to allegations of sexual misconduct, (3) following a clearly irregular investigative or adjudicative process, (4) amid criticism for reacting inadequately to allegations of sexual misconduct by members of one sex, these circumstances provide the requisite support for a prima facie case of sex discrimination.” Menaker, 935 F.3d at 33. We were also careful to describe the circumstances in which the case arose, noting that “[t]he events at issue occurred against a general background of debate and criticism concerning the handling of allegations of sexual harassment and misconduct by American universities, including Hofstra.” Id. at 26.
The circumstances of Ali-Hasan’s termination are not analogous to those in Menaker. Assuming arguendo that the theory we articulated in Menaker and subsequent cases such as Vengalattore v. Cornell University, 36 F.4th 87 (2d Cir. 2022), is applicable outside the educational context, Ali-Hasan has provided no evidence suggesting that Appellees were under “criticism for reacting inadequately to allegations of sexual misconduct by members of one sex.” Menaker, 935 F.3d at 33. Instead, Ali-Hasan asks us to disregard this element, effectively reading it out of the Menaker analysis. We decline this invitation. But, even if we were to do so, Ali-Hasan would not prevail. While a plaintiff asserting a claim of sex discrimination may be able to raise an inference of discriminatory intent by “point[ing] to evidence closely tied to the adverse employment action that could reasonably be interpreted as indicating that discrimination drove the decision,” Sassaman v. Gamache, 566 F.3d 307, 315 (2d Cir. 2009), Ali-Hasan has not provided any such evidence here. Unlike in Sassaman, where the plaintiff produced evidence showing that his supervisor made “an invidious comment about the propensity of men to harass sexually their female colleagues,” id. at 312, nothing in the record here leads to an inference that Ali-Hasan’s termination was motivated by sex bias. Thus, Ali-Hasan’s framing of the questions on appeal—whether a policy of special vigilance is required in order to invoke Menaker, or whether other evidence can create an inference of discrimination—creates a false dichotomy, because his claim fails in either case.
Instead, Ali-Hasan relies on the allegedly “clearly irregular” nature of Appellees’ investigation to raise an inference of discrimination. Even assuming arguendo that Appellees’ investigation was “clearly irregular,” Ali-Hasan has no basis for asserting that this factor can, on its own, create such an inference. Under our precedent, to state a prima facie case of sex discrimination, Ali-Hasan was required to present evidence that Appellees were under pressure concerning their treatment of sexual misconduct complaints or to provide other evidence from which a court could infer that his termination was motivated by sex bias. See Menaker, 935 F.3d at 33; Sassaman, 566 F.3d at 315.
Accordingly, the court concluded that since plaintiff failed to do either, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on his Title VII claim.