In Brown v. Cnty. of Westchester, 22-CV-06146 (PMH), 2024 WL 21937 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2024), the court, inter alia, denied defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims of race discrimination, sex/gender discrimination, and hostile work environment (but only as to timely conduct).
From the decision:
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII a plaintiff must allege that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she is qualified for the position held; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. The same elements apply to a claim for Title VII sexual harassment because sexual harassment is a form of gender discrimination.
The only form of sexual harassment that Plaintiff alleges are Mirza’s unwanted advances that occurred in November 2019. Given that this conduct occurred more than 300 days prior to the filing of the EEOC Charge, and that it is the only alleged sexual harassment to which Plaintiff was subjected, Plaintiff’s Title VII theory is dismissed to the extent that it relies on a sexual harassment theory of liability. Plaintiff has plausibly alleged, when drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, that she was subjected to public admonishments and reprimands from Adimari because of her status as an African American woman. (SAC ¶ 154 (“Adimari did not subject Plaintiff’s similarly situated non-female, non-African American co-workers to public admonishments and/or defamation for reporting potential violations of the law”)). Plaintiff has further plausibly alleged that her termination was because of her membership in these protected classes. Plaintiff has therefore plausibly alleged, when drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, a Title VII discrimination claim under the race discrimination, sex/gender discrimination, and hostile work environment theories of liability.
Accordingly, the Court denies the motion to dismiss the first claim for relief for discrimination in violation of Title VII.
[Internal citations, bracketing, and ellipses.]
The court went on, however, to grant the motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim of Title VII retaliation, since plaintiff failed to plausibly allege any timely adverse employment actions were because of her engaging in protected activity.