In Anderson, Keesha v. Amazon.com, Inc. et al, 23-cv-8347, 2024 WL 2801986 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2024), the court, inter alia, denied defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims of race discrimination/hostile work environment under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws.
From the decision:
The NYCHRL does not distinguish between claims of ‘discrimination’ and ‘harassment’ or hostile work environment[.]” Mitura v. Finco Servs., Inc., 2024 WL 232323, at *3 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2024). To state a discrimination claim under city law, a “plaintiff need only show differential treatment—that she is treated less well—because of a discriminatory intent.” Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 872 N.Y.S.2d 27, 36–41 (1st Dep’t 2009). The NYSHRL standard is “close[ ] to the standard of the NYCHRL.” Mitura, 2024 WL 232323, at *4 n.4 (citation omitted). Under state law, a plaintiff must show that she was subjected to “inferior terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual’s membership in one or more of the protected categories.” Id. at *4 (cleaned up).
These standards are similar to that articulated in Muldrow, so the same conclusion follows: Anderson has adequately pleaded discrimination claims under the NYCHRL and NYSHRL. Defendants’ only argument against these claims is that Anderson “does not allege facts that rise above the level of … petty slights and trivial inconveniences.” Dkt. 74 at 18 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the NYCHRL, “courts may … dismiss truly insubstantial cases,” but only when “the defense is clear as a matter of law.” Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 111 (internal quotation marks omitted). “In evaluating … the defendant’s affirmative defense, courts must consider the totality of the circumstances,” and “a jury is often best suited to make this determination.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the defense is not clear as a matter of law. The Court can’t say the alleged conduct was “truly insubstantial” when accepting all the allegations as true and drawing inferences in Anderson’s favor. She says she was denied opportunities for advancement, passed around to different managers, given menial job assignments, unfairly criticized, and put on a PIP.
The court concluded that “[a] jury might find that this conduct qualifies as being ‘treated less well’ or being subjected to ‘inferior conditions of employment.'”