In Sargent v. Amazon.com, Inc., Civil Action No. 23-1330-RGA, 2024 WL 3936490 (D.Del. Aug. 26, 2024), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s race- and sex-based discrimination claims asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
Plaintiff alleges Defendants discriminated against him based on race and sex by “fail[ing] to take any corrective action to eradicate the discriminatory comments,” by “assign[ing] him the role of removing the discriminatory writings,” and by “constructively demoting him and ultimately forcing him to take medical leave.” (D.I. 8 at 6).
To state a prima facie claim for discrimination under Title VII, Plaintiff must allege: “(1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position he sought to attain or retain; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the action occurred under circumstances that could give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.” Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008). “[Courts] evaluate plaintiffs’ DDEA claims under the same framework used to evaluate Title VII claims.” Spady v. Wesley Coll., 2010 WL 3907357, at *3 n. 4 (D. Del. Sept. 29, 2010) (citing Witcher v. Sodexho, Inc., 247 F. App’x 328, 329 n. 1 (3d Cir. 2007)); see also Hyland v. Smyrna Sch. Dist., 608 F. App’x 79, 83 n. 5 (3d Cir. 2015) (instructing that “the standards under Title VII and the DDEA are generally the same”). “[T]he substantive elements of a claim under section 1981 are generally identical to the elements of an employment discrimination claim under Title VII.” Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 181–82 (3d Cir. 2009).
An “adverse employment action” is “an action by an employer that is ‘serious and tangible enough to alter an employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.’ ” Storey v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 390 F.3d 760, 764 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 263 (3d Cir. 2001)). Such an action must constitute “a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998).
Defendants maintain that Plaintiff fails to allege an adverse employment action.1 (D.I. 6 at 4). Plaintiff contends Defendants altered the terms, conditions, and privileges of his employment by failing to take corrective action for over six months and by “forcing him to act in a custodial role.” (D.I. 8 at 6–8). Plaintiff also argues he was constructively demoted as he was “forced to transfer to a different shift in an effort to protect his wellbeing.” (Id. at 8).
The Complaint plausibly alleges that Defendants assigned Plaintiff to perform tasks outside his job description requiring Plaintiff to locate and remove boxes with discriminatory writing.2 These tasks that do not appear to fall within a stower’s job responsibilities. Defendants argue that “a mere change in job duties is not an adverse employment action.” (D.I. 9 at 3 (citing Meltzer v. City of Wilmington, 932 F. Supp. 2d 602, 610–11 (D. Del. 2013)). Meltzer, which addressed a motion for summary judgment (see id. at 605), does not stand for this proposition. Rather, the court in Meltzer noted “a change in job assignments or work-related duties may only be [an] adverse employment action if the change is substantial and material and it alters the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Id. at 611 (quoting Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1245 (11th Cir. 2001)). While I have some doubts regarding the substantiality of Plaintiff’s altered responsibilities, that factual question is better addressed at a later stage (and, in any event, Defendants’ briefing does not discuss materiality).
The court concluded that, in light of its finding that Plaintiff has adequately pled an adverse employment action based on Plaintiff’s assignment to custodial duties, it declined to address whether plaintiff’s other asserted adverse employment actions are sufficient to maintain a discrimination claim.