In Simmons v. The City of New York, No. 157761/2023, 2024 WL 4467701 (N.Y. Sup Ct, New York County Oct. 08, 2024), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims of disability discrimination.
From the decision:
The City’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim of disability discrimination is denied. In addition to the Harrington factors, to sufficiently allege a prima facie case of disability discrimination under State HRL and City HRL, “the plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she suffered from a disability and that disability caused the behavior for which they were terminated.” Pimentel v. Citibank, N.A., 29 A.D.3d 141, 144 (1st Dep’t 2006). Under State HRL disability is defined as “a physical, mental, or medical impairment…which upon the provision of reasonable accommodations, does not prevent the complainant from performing in a reasonable manner the activities involved in the job or occupation sought or held.” Id. at 145. Under City HRL, disability is defined as “any physical, medical, mental, or psychological impairment…and an employe has the obligation to ‘make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to satisfy the essential requisites of a job…provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the [employer].’ ” Watson v. Emblem Health Services, 158 A.D.3d 179, 182 (1st Dep’t 2018).
The City argues that Plaintiff failed to plead a cause of action for disability discrimination because Plaintiff did not allege facts that give rise to an inference that The City acted with discriminatory animus by terminating her employment. (NYSCEF Doc. No. 9). The City contends that Plaintiff failed to show that she is a member of a protected class by establishing (NYSCEF Doc. No. 2). Plaintiff argues that The City was aware of her disability because, prior to her termination, she was authorized to be absent from work pursuant to authorization by the Health Management Division. (NYSCEF Doc. No. 14). Plaintiff contends that her termination was based on disability discrimination because-although she had leave authorizations-she was charged with misconduct, threatened with termination at an administrative hearing unless she agreed to a probationary term of 18-months, and ultimately terminated for excessive use of leave due to the disability.
In sum, the court concluded that plaintiff sufficiently pled a cause of action for disability discrimination, in that they alleged a disability within the meaning of the New York State and City Human Rights Laws and suffered an adverse employment action because of the disability.