In Reach v. Healthfirst, Inc., 23-CV-8085 (JPO), 2024 WL 4493769 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2024), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s hostile work environment claims asserted under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws.[1]The court initially found that plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege claims under federal law.
From the decision:
Unlike her federal claims, Reach’s allegation of a hostile work environment satisfies the less rigorous standard imposed by the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(7), and the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law § 96. Under those laws, “a plaintiff must allege that she was treated ‘less well’ because of her employer’s discriminatory intent.” Harris v. N.Y.C. Hum. Res. Admin., No. 20-CV-2011, 2022 WL 3100663, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2022) (quoting Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 2013)); see also Nguedi v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of N.Y., 813 F. App’x 616, 617-18 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order); Arazi v. Cohen Bros. Realty Corp., No. 20-CV-8837, 2022 WL 912940, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2022) (“[P]laintiffs … under the NYSHRL faced a higher burden than those looking to do so under the NYCHRL prior to the NYSHRL’s amendment in 2019. After that amendment, the standard for NYSHRL aligns with the NYCHRL standard for claims that accrued on or after October 11, 2019.”).
To satisfy the “less well” treatment requirement, a plaintiff must “merely plausibly allege ‘differential treatment that is more than trivial, insubstantial, or petty.’ ” Harris, 2022 WL 3100663, at *8 (quoting Torre v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 3d 276, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)); see also Boonmalert v. City of N.Y., 721 F. App’x 29, 34 (2d Cir. 2018) (“[U]nder the NYCHRL, the alleged hostile conduct need not be severe or pervasive.”). Reach’s allegations that Richardson was unresponsive, spoke to her in a hostile tone, and leveled “made-up” accusations at her (FAC ¶¶ 52, 56-58), meet this low bar. Cf. Harris, 2022 WL 3100663, at *13-14 (denying motion to dismiss hostile work environment claim based on allegations that the defendant repeatedly made hostile remarks and reprimanded the plaintiff, unlike her white coworkers); Drew v. Plaza Const. Corp., 688 F. Supp. 2d 270, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying motion to dismiss hostile work environment claim under New York law based on allegations that the defendant “was harsh and critical, made unreasonable demands, and often raised his voice and directed profanity at” the plaintiff); Santiago v. ACACIA Network, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 3d 143, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (denying motion to dismiss where the plaintiff alleged she was paid less than a white male comparator, provided with fewer opportunities for promotion, and not given a free parking spot).
Reach has also adequately alleged discriminatory intent. To establish liability under the NYCHRL, a plaintiff need only allege that they were treated less well than other employees “at least in part for a discriminatory reason.” Bohlinger v. Abbott Lab’ys Inc., 843 F. App’x 374, 376 (2d Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 110 n.8); Watson v. Emblem Health Servs., 69 N.Y.S.3d 595, 598 (2018) (“A plaintiff may prove her case if she ‘proves that unlawful discrimination was one of the motivating factors, even if it was not the sole motivating factor, for an adverse employment decision.’ ”) (quoting Melman v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 946 N.Y.S.2d 27, 40 (1st Dep’t 2012)). At the motion to dismiss stage, the plaintiff must plausibly allege “at least minimal support for the proposition that the employer was motivated by discriminatory intent.” Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 313.
An allegation that an employer treated plaintiff “less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside [their] protected group” is sufficient to raise the inference of discrimination at this stage. Mandell v. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 379 (2d Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2000)); see also Ruiz v. Cnty. of Rockland, 609 F.3d 486, 493 (2d Cir. 2010). An allegation of differential treatment must include “a reasonably close resemblance of the facts and circumstances of plaintiff’s and comparator’s cases,” but not necessarily “that both cases are identical.” Graham, 230 F.3d at 40.
Reach alleges that Patsy, a Black woman, held the same position and performed substantially the same duties as Reach. (FAC ¶ 52.) Reach alleges further that she never observed Richardson making any negative comments toward Patsy and that Richardson took Patsy’s side when moderating a dispute between the two of them. (Id. ¶ 52-54.) Reach’s allegation of a reasonable comparator from outside her protected group who was treated more favorably than her gives rise to an inference of discriminatory intent sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Compare Bramble v. Moody’s Corp., No. 23-506, 2024 WL 705955, at *3 (2d Cir. Feb. 21, 2024) (summary order) (holding that the plaintiff did not raise an inference of discriminatory intent where she “failed to explain how she was similarly situated to any of the employees to whom she sought to compare herself—all of whom held different titles, performed different job duties, worked in different departments, or had different levels of seniority”); Serrano v. City of N.Y., 208 N.Y.S.3d 603, 604 (1st Dep’t 2024) (“[P]laintiffs raised an inference of animus through their allegations of differential treatment of similarly situated white officers in terms of assignments, evaluations, and placement on performance monitoring.”).
[Citations, internal quotation marks, and headings omitted.]
Accordingly, the court concluded that because Reach plausibly alleges she was subject to a hostile work environment caused at least in part by discriminatory intent for purposes of state and city law, her claims under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL are sufficient to proceed past a motion to dismiss.
| ↩1 | The court initially found that plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege claims under federal law. |
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