In Munck v. Simons Foundation, 2024 WL 4307776 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2024), the court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s race-based hostile work environment claim asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
After determining that plaintiff did not allege any timely acts to “anchor” earlier related acts to enable her to present a “single, timely claim”, the court explained:
[T]he only timely act alleged in support of her hostile work environment claim is Wyka’s termination on August 1, 2022. (See Compl. ¶ 81.) But this allegation falls short for two reasons. First, termination is a “discrete act” that cannot form part of the same continuing act. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114. Second, the alleged discriminatory conduct must occur because of Plaintiff’s protected characteristic. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); see Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2007). That is, while alleged harassment against another employee may support a claim for hostile work environment, the other employee must nonetheless belong to the same protected class as Plaintiff. See Smith v. AVSC Int’l, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 302, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see also Leibovitz v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 252 F.3d 179, 190 (2d Cir. 2001). Plaintiff’s hostile work environment theory is rooted in discrimination based on her being Asian and Thai. (See Compl. ¶ 17.) Wyka is Polish. (See id. ¶ 77.) Wyka’s termination is therefore unrelated to Plaintiff’s claim for hostile work environment and cannot anchor the untimely acts. Accordingly, the continuing violation doctrine does not apply, and the limitations period bars Plaintiffs’ untimely acts.
The court concluded by noting that “Title VII does not serve as a ‘general civility code’” and thus that “in the absence of any plausible allegations to support her claim for hostile work environment, Plaintiff’s first cause of action must be dismissed.”