In Mazzuchelli v. Immutable Pty. Ltd and Lightsource Global, 23-cv-7885 (NSR), 2024 WL 4817535 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2024), the court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s hostile work environment sexual harassment claim asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The court summarized and applied the law as follows:
A sexual harassment claim is actionable under Title VII “when the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Middleton v. Metro. Coll. of New York, 545 F. Supp. 2d 369, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 764-765 (2d Cir.1998)). Whether an environment is hostile or abusive “depends on the totality of the circumstances, and courts must consider a variety of factors including ‘the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.’ ” Id. Important context is that “[a]s a general matter, ‘isolated remarks or occasional episodes of harassment’ are not actionable, but rather, ‘the incidents of harassment must occur in concert or within a regularity that can be reasonably termed pervasive.’ ” Id.
Plaintiff’s Title VII’s sexual harassment claim fails to meet the standard needed to survive a motion to dismiss. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the sexual harassment Anderson subjected Plaintiff to did not alter Plaintiff’s condition of employment and did not create an abusive working environment for reasons the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s FEHA sexual harassment claim discussed supra. Plaintiff avers four separate, discrete instances of sexual harassment that, taken together, do not allow for the harassment to be “termed pervasive.” Middleton, 545 F. Supp. 2d 369, 374. Plaintiff pleads that she was uncomfortable with the “graphic sexual discussions” and with Anderson’s “sexual overtures” (see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31, 34), but the Complaint, as currently written, does not plead facts that would demonstrate that Anderson’s conduct was threatening or humiliating. Middleton, 545 F. Supp. 2d 369, 374. Moreover, while Plaintiff does allege she felt some relief at the news that Anderson would be leaving Immutable, Plaintiff does not substantively plead that Anderson’s conduct unreasonably interfered with Plaintiff’s work.
The court noted that while plaintiff may be able to amend her complaint to plausibly allege the requisite severity, but as currently written, it did not plausibly allege a Title VII sexual harassment claim.