In LaChapel v. Brio Solar Energy, LLC et al, 2024 WL 5089561 (N.D.Tex. Dec. 12, 2024), the court denied plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment on his hostile work environment asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
LaChapel fails to state a cognizable claim for a hostile work environment. To bring a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must allege that “he (1) belongs to a protected group; (2) was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was based on race; (4) the harassment complained of affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; [and] (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to take prompt remedial action. ” Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 651 (5th Cir. 2012) (quotations omitted). If the harassment was committed by a supervisor with immediate or successively higher authority over the victim, then a plaintiff need only make a showing as to the first four elements. See Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella, S.A., 266 F.3d 343, 353 (5th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
LaChapel’s hostile work environment claim is insufficient for two reasons. First, LaChapel does not allege that he “was subjected to unwelcome harassment.” Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 651. In fact, none of the discriminatory conduct that LaChapel alleges was directed at him. Instead, he alleges that Defendants engaged in “egregious conduct against non-white potential customers.” Id. ¶ 18. But to claim a hostile work environment under Title VII, he must allege, among other things, that he “was subjected to unwelcome harassment … based on race.” Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 651. Title VII protects employees in a protected class from being “exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which [employees outside of their protected class] are not exposed.” See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). By “afford[ing] employees the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,” Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986), Title VII contemplates the targeting of an employee. Yuknis v. First Student, Inc., 481 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 65). LaChapel alleges that Defendants’ “practice of discriminating against Indian and Pakistani potential customers caused [him] considerable distress and anxiety, particularly because the people targeted … were not white and were people of color.” Id. ¶ 22. He alleges that these practices “adversely affect[ed] his status as an employee, because of his race.” Id. ¶ 24. But he fails to allege that any of the statements made were directed at him. Because he only alleges that negative comments were made about potential customers and not directed towards LaChapel, this claim fails. See Doc. 1, Compl., ¶¶ 16–17, 22, 28.
Second, he fails to allege that “the harassment complained of was based on race.” Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 651. LaChapel alleges that Brio discriminated against potential customers who were Southeast Asian. Doc. 1, Compl., ¶¶ 16–17, 22, 28. But he does not allege that any of the discriminatory conduct was directed at a class that includes him.
Based on this, the court concluded that plaintiff “fails to allege a Title VII hostile work environment claim and this basis is insufficient for default judgment.”