In Quiles-Carrasquillo v. Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General of the U.S. Postal Service, Civil No. 23-1468 (FAB), 2025 WL 25672 (D.Puerto Rico Jan. 3, 2025), the court, inter alia, adopted a Magistrate Judge’s Report & Recommendation recommending the denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s sex-based hostile work environment claim pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The court recited the facts, in part, as follows:
The USPS hired Quiles in 2016. She subsequently served as the Postmaster of the Luqillo Post Office. On February 19, 2022, two USPS employees and American Postal Workers Union (“APWU”) representatives, Gabriel Medina (“Medina”) and Luis Soto (“Soto”), entered the Luquillo Post Office through the cargo area without authorization to do so. Quiles asked Medina and Soto about their presence in the cargo area. Soto responded that he had scheduled a meeting. Because Soto refused to provide confirmation or proof of the meeting, Quiles requested Soto and Medina to leave.
This directive enraged Soto. He moved closer to Quiles, invading her personal space in an alleged effort to threaten and intimidate her. Soto then proceeded to sexually and verbally assault her in an extreme and outrageous manner. Soto’s prolonged verbal assault on Quiles included graphic sexual language (“what kind of Postmaster are you with such a greasy ass, not even my cock reaches there, it doesn’t fit in your ass”), veiled threats of violence, (“look at my face very closely for when you see me on the street, bitch”), and menacing, invasive body language. This verbal assault continued while Soto followed Quiles around the office spewing graphic, sexually explicit, and violent insults at Quiles. She attempted to call the manager of USPS operations and the police.
[Citations omitted.]
In reviewing the recommendation as to the pleading sufficiency of plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim, the court explained:
The magistrate judge recommends that plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim be allowed to move forward, in part, because he determined that, while the conduct in question was confined to one incident on February 19, 2022, it was severe and egregious enough to “evince a hostile work environment.” (Docket No. 78 at p. 21.) (citing Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 84 (1st Cir. 2005)) (additional citations omitted).
The defendant argues that the magistrate judge’s recommendation is wrong as a matter of law. The defendant cites numerous cases in the first circuit that collectively show how a single incident rarely clears the threshold for a hostile work environment claim. See e.g., Pomales v. Celulares Telefonica, Inc., 447 F.3d 79, 84 (1st Cir. 2006); Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 783 (1st Cir. 1990); Morgan v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 901 F.2d 186, 192–93 (1st Cir. 1990). Although the defendant admits that a single incident might rise to the level of a hostile work environment, it argues that these incidents typically involve unwanted physical contact. (Docket No. 93 at p. 4) (citing Pomales 447 F.3d at 84).
As the magistrate judge noted, however, in evaluating hostile work environment claims, courts will distinguish between “mere offensive utterances” and statements that are “physically threatening or humiliating.” (Docket No. 78 at p. 21) (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)). The magistrate judge further determined that in this case the statements go well beyond mere offensive utterances, and the Court agrees. In fact, taking the allegations as true as the Court must, it is hard to imagine a scenario in which Soto’s comments could be much more physically threatening or humiliating.Defendant cites Pomales, 447 F.3d at 84, for the proposition that “successful single-incident claims typically have involved unwanted physical contact.” The Court recognizes that this quote is right on point, but not for the reasons defendant believes. Because Soto’s conduct and the statements he made were so extreme and prolonged, the question before the Court is whether any set of statements, confined to one event and absent physical touching, can be sufficient to sustain a hostile work environment claim. If the Court finds that Soto’s alleged statements are insufficient to meet this threshold, it is likely no set of hostile statements would be sufficient to sustain a claim. The First Circuit Court of Appeals, does not “preclude the possibility of a single-incident hostile work environment claim based on exclusively verbal conduct.” Pomales, 447 F.3d at 84. Given the content and duration of the threats endured by the plaintiff, the Court finds that if any single-incident hostile work environment claim based on exclusively verbal conduct exists, it is this one.
This decision thus illustrates that a hostile work environment claim may proceed on the ground of verbal conduct alone (i.e., absent physical touching).