In Hamilton v. Siemens Healthcare Diagnostics, Inc., 2025 WL 863572 (S.D.N.Y. March 18, 2025), the court, inter alia, dismissed plaintiff’s hostile work environment claims.
After summarizing the black-letter law, the court applied it to the facts as follows:
Plaintiff alleges that he experienced “a pattern of activity aimed at bringing about [his] resignation.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 17; see also Pl’s Opp. 10 (citing Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17–25, 29–31, 35–37, 41–51, 55, 65, 74–77).) The alleged conduct is not “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [Plaintiff’s] employment.” Alfano, 294 F.3d at 373 (quotation marks omitted). In December 2021, Howell “spoke so aggressively and disrespectfully to Plaintiff … that multiple of Plaintiff’s co-workers reached out to him after the meeting to ask him what was going on … and if he was okay.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff characterizes this as “a humiliating incident.” (Id.) This is akin to a “stray” remark that is insufficient to establish a hostile work environment. See Lopez v. White Plains Hosp., No. 19-CV-6263, 2022 WL 1004188, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2022) (collecting cases) (“It is well established that ‘the stray remarks even of a decision-maker, without more, cannot prove a claim of employment discrimination.’ ” (alteration adopted) (quoting Hasemann v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., No. 11-CV-554, 2013 WL 696424, at *6 (D. Conn. Feb. 26, 2013)), aff’d, No. 22-817, 2022 WL 19835765 (2d Cir. May 16, 2022). Even if Plaintiff was humiliated, such an incident cannot be considered sufficiently pervasive, “given that single incidents can amount to a hostile work environment only where they are ‘extraordinarily severe.’ ” Royall v. City of Beacon, No. 24-CV-3, 2024 WL 4266546, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2024) (quoting Alfano, 294 F.3d at 374). In January 2022, Plaintiff’s request for leave was denied and Howell insisted he return to the office immediately, thereby requiring him to get the COVID-19 vaccine or be terminated. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 35–37.) Plaintiff alleges that “[t]his placed a great deal of stress upon Plaintiff and his family.” (Id. ¶ 37.) Plaintiff also points to being required to return to the office, (id. ¶¶ 41–45), being assigned menial tasks, (id. ¶¶ 45–46), and his demotion, (id. ¶¶ 47–51). Either individually or together, these alleged events are not plausibly objectively severe or pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work environment. See, e.g., Olin v. Rochester City Sch. Dist., 596 F. Supp. 3d 475, 488 (W.D.N.Y. 2022) (“mean” boss who subjected plaintiff to unfair scrutiny and criticism did not plausibly create hostile work environment absent “sexist or disparaging remarks, threats, physical interactions or other egregious conduct”); Garcia v. NYC Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 19-CV-997, 2019 WL 6878729, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2019) (collecting cases).
Further, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly establish causation—that is, that any of the conduct he claims created a hostile work environment was the result of his religion or sex. (See generally Am Compl.) In other words, to the extent that Plaintiff raises allegations to establish a connection between the alleged hostile environment and his protected characteristics, those allegations are wholly conclusory. Courts consistently dismiss similar cases where plaintiffs make only conclusory allegations with regard to causation. See Royall, 2024 WL 4266546, at *20 (collecting cases); Paupaw-Myrie, 653 F. Supp. 3d at 106 (dismissing a hostile work environment claim where plaintiff had not plausibly alleged that alleged discriminatory conduct arose from animus based on plaintiff’s protected category); Varughese v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., No. 12-CV-8812, 2015 WL 1499618, at *42 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2015) (finding it was “fallacy” for plaintiff to say: “I belong to a protected class; something bad happened to me at work; therefore, it must have occurred because I belong to a protected class.”)
Based on this, held the court, dismissal was warranted.