In Smart, Kathyann v. USA Labor for Hire, Inc., RC Global Energy Group, Inc., Oleg Tsimbler, No. 24-1791, 2025 WL 1217365 (2d Cir. April 28, 2025), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, inter alia, affirmed the lower court’s denial of defendant’s motion for new trial or remittitur on plaintiff’s claims of hostile work environment based on sex, gender, race, and color in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the New York City Human Rights Law.
From the decision:
Defendants first argue that the district court should have granted a new trial or remittitur because there was insufficient evidence as to Smart’s hostile work environment claims. Under Title VII, “[a] hostile work environment claim requires a showing [1] that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment, and [2] that a specific basis exists for imputing the objectionable conduct to the employer.” Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 373 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). We analyze NYCHRL hostile work environment claims “separately and independently from federal … claims” because “the federal severe or pervasive standard of liability no longer applies to NYCHRL claims.” Mihalik v. Credit Argicole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 113 (2d Cir. 2013). Nevertheless, “the NYCHRL is not a general civility code,” and “a defendant is not liable if the plaintiff fails to prove the conduct is caused at least in part by discriminatory … motives or if the defendant proves the conduct was nothing more than petty slights or trivial inconveniences.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Upon reviewing the record in this case, we conclude that there was ample evidence from which the jury could have reasonably concluded that Smart was subjected to a hostile work environment based on sex, gender, race, and color in violation of both Title VII and the NYCHRL. For example, Smart testified at length about how Tsimbler repeatedly used racially derogatory and sexist language in reference to her.
Despite this evidence, Defendants argue that a new trial or remittitur was warranted because the district court permitted Smart to introduce hearsay concerning the meaning of Ukrainian terms that Tsimbler frequently used when referring to her. Although Smart acknowledged that she does not speak Ukrainian, she nevertheless testified that a co-worker told her that those words translated to a disrespectful, derogatory term for a woman. In response to Defendants’ hearsay objection, the court instructed the jurors that the evidence was received only “for the fact that the statement was said and [Smart’s] understanding of it,” not “for the truth of the fact of what it means in Ukrainian.” But even if we were to assume that the jury disregarded the court’s instruction, the hearsay would be harmless in light of the wealth of other evidence supporting Smart’s hostile work environment claims. See United States v. Rivera, 22 F.3d 430, 436 (2d Cir. 1994).
[Emphasis added.]
Based on this, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendants’ motion for a new trial or remittitur on this ground.