In Cosenza v. Rivian Automotive, LLC, Case No. 1:23-cv-01297-JEH, 2025 WL 1603911 (C.D.Ill. April 24, 2025), the court, inter alia, held that plaintiff’s allegations met the “severe or pervasive” standard in connection with her claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment claim asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
After reviewing the pertinent case law, the court concluded that there was no genuine dispute as to the facts alleged by the Plaintiff, but, instead, whether it qualifies as severe or pervasive.
It elaborated:
In considering whether Plaintiff’s allegations rise to the level of severe or pervasive, the Court first looks to the frequency of the facts at issue. On this point, the evidence tilts in the Plaintiff’s favor because she alleges that she was subjected to “daily” harassment, including catcalls from male coworkers like “nice tits,” “nice ass,” and “bend over,” that occurred in “plain view of Rivian supervisors.” (D. 20 at ECF p. 2 & 22-23).4 Rivian contends that Plaintiff cannot rely on these allegations to defeat summary judgment because “she admits she cannot identify who engaged in this conduct or when any of this conduct occurred.” (D. 24 at ECF p. 23) (emphasis in original). While Plaintiff may be unable to identify the exact individual or individuals allegedly catcalling her, she alleges that it occurred daily and she testified that “you could walk down the line and you would hear how these men talked,” and that she did not know who was saying it because “they’re on a moving line. There’s groups of men standing in a group. You hear that, you turn around and you look and you’ve got five or six men standing there. You have no way of knowing who said it.” (D. 20 at ECF p. 2 & 20-1 at ECF p. 96-97). Plaintiff, therefore, has supplied enough details to “evaluate the severity and pervasiveness of the conduct,” as she supplies the “when, where, [and] how often” the alleged conduct occurred. Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chicago Heights Ill. Sch. Dist. 163, 315 F.3d 817, 822 (7th Cir. 2003). Next, while the Plaintiff does not allege any incidents that were physically threatening per se, she does allege several highly inappropriate comments and, in some instances, that her colleagues did engage in unwelcomed physical contact. With respect to whether the conduct Plaintiff alleges is humiliating, she claims, among other things, that Redd, a Rivian Team Lead, asked Plaintiff “if she could facilitate group sex with her daughter.” (D. 1 at ECF p. 4). She also claims that male employees “feign[ed] masturbation and ejaculation and then mock[ed] [Plaintiff] when she noticed this behavior and expressed her discomfort,” and that she and other female employees were referred to as “bitches” and “cunts.” Id. at ECF p. 3-4. Plaintiff’s allegations, therefore, are distinguishable from the cases cited by the Defendant so far as those decisions found an inactionable sexual harassment claim because they were isolated incidents or did not include explicit sexual invitations. (D. 18 at ECF p. 16-18). Here, Cosenza claims that she was subjected to daily harassment, and at least one request to “facilitate group sex with her daughter.” (D. 1 at ECF p. 3 & D. 20 at ECF p. 2). And, despite Rivian’s framing of the allegations as a “few isolated incidents,” the Court is to “look at the totality of the circumstances[,]” not view them in isolation. Hall, 713 F.3d at 331 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998)); (D. 18 at ECF p. 18). Similarly, unlike the ambiguous comments in Adusumilli, 164 F.3d at 361-62, many of the incidents alleged by Plaintiff were unambiguously directed at her. (D. 1 at ECF p. 3-4). Indeed, the allegedly harassing conduct escalated from verbal to physical when, in June 2022, Plaintiff’s coworker, Williams, allegedly “placed his fingers between Cosenza’s breasts without consent and commented that Cosenza had a plunging neckline.” (D. 1 at ECF p. 4). After she reported this incident, Plaintiff alleges that Williams was told by human resources “in advance that he was being terminated and why,” which Plaintiff contends provided him with the opportunity to send the email to Rivian personnel stating, among other things, that “the complaints made by Cosenza were false and that she was lying.” (D. 1 at ECF p. 5). After Williams’ email, Plaintiff alleges that Redd, the same Rivian Team Lead that Plaintiff claims requested group sex with her daughter, allegedly did so again when he “placed his chin on her shoulder and taunted her about Williams’ email.” Id. at ECF p. 6. Such allegations may be properly viewed as severe or pervasive, and they cannot be summarily dismissed at this stage as mere offensive utterances when viewed in the context of the “daily” occurrences Plaintiff alleges. These facts are also distinguishable from Mercer, 527 F. App’x at 518, because Plaintiff alleges the catcalls “occurred in plain view of Rivian supervisors” and testified that it was “just openly accepted” by Rivian, (D. 20 at ECF p. 2 & D. 20-1 at ECF p. 97), whereas, in Mercer, the Court found the Defendant’s announcement of “several roll calls” that such behavior would not be tolerated as mitigating the employer’s liability. 527 F. App’x at 520.
There is also evidence that the alleged harassment altered the conditions of her employment and interfered with her work performance. She alleges that she was forced “to hide behind lockers and equipment to avoid harassment by a male employee known … as the ‘Forklift pervert,’ ” (D. 1 at ECF p. 4), and that after she reported incidents of harassment, she “experienced isolation from her coworkers,” and that she “was not feeling safe at all being there in that building.” (D. 20 at ECF p. 4).5 As a result, she alleges “she avoided shared spaces, modified her work routines, and ultimately felt compelled to resign due to concerns for her physical safety.” (D. 20 at ECF p. 21). Together, these facts show that Plaintiff has alleged facts that may qualify as severe or pervasive harassment.
The court further explained, in a detailed analysis, that plaintiff provided a sufficient basis for employer liability.