In Leavines, Isabella v. Ollie’s Bargain Outlet, Inc. and Lorenzo Duffey, Civil Action No. 2:24-932, 2025 WL 1635192 (W.D.Pa. June 10, 2025), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s quid pro quo sexual harassment claim asserted in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
In Count II, Plaintiff alleges a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment based on Duffey’s actions. Defendants move to dismiss this claim on the ground that she fails to allege an adverse employment action related to the alleged harassment.
Title VII forbids actions taken on the basis of sex that discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. Claims for sexual harassment under Title VII may be based on two potential theories: (1) a quid pro quo claim and/or (2) a claim of hostile work environment. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 62 (1986) (“[A] violation of Title VII may be predicated on either of two types of sexual harassment: harassment that involves the conditioning of concrete employment benefits on sexual favors, and harassment that, while not affecting economic benefits, creates a hostile or offensive work environment.”)
With respect to a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that: [u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute [quid pro quo] sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual’s employment [or] (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual. …
A plaintiff must demonstrate either that she submitted to the sexual advances of her alleged harasser or suffered a tangible employment action as a result of her refusal to submit to those sexual advances. To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff alleging quid pro quo harassment must plead facts to show either (1) he/she submitted to sexual advances based on the quid pro quo offer or threat or (2) a harasser took tangible employment action based on refusal to submit to his/her sexual advances or demands, and (3) the harasser had workplace authority sufficient to carry out the quid pro quo offer or threat.
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The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was getting fewer work hours and complained to Duffey. Thereafter, Duffey, her manager, said he would give her more work hours in exchange for oral sex. Plaintiff complied in part because of Duffey’s “power over her.” Subsequently, when she asked Duffey about being scheduled for more work hours, he said she would “have to open up her availability.” After her last day of work, she continued to communicate with Duffey because she thought she might be scheduled for more hours. During that time, she agreed to Duffey’s request that she send him nude photos but she did not receive more work hours. Duffey fired her shortly thereafter. These allegations are sufficient to state a claim of quid pro quo discrimination.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff alleges that she received additional shifts before the harassing conduct occurred. However, Plaintiff has also alleged that Duffey told her he would provide her additional shifts if she performed sexual acts on him and she did so. Whether he actually provided the shifts thereafter is irrelevant. See Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1297 (3d Cir. 1997) (“a quid pro quo violation occurs at the time when an employee is told that his or her compensation, etc. is dependent upon submission to unwelcome sexual advances. At that point, the employee has been subjected to discrimination because of sex.”), overruled in part on other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
[Citations and internal quotation marks omitted; paragraphing altered.]
Accordingly, held the court, dismissal was not warranted.