In Kapllanaj v. Healthfirst PHSP, Inc., No. 152720/2021, 2025 WL 1707852 (N.Y. Sup Ct, New York County June 17, 2025), the court, inter alia, denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s retaliation claims asserted under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws.
From the decision:
The branch of the motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is denied. To set forth a prima facie case of retaliation under the New York City Human Rights Law, a plaintiff must show (1) they engaged in protected activity known to defendant; (2) defendant took an adverse action against the plaintiff; and (3) there exists a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action” (Cadet-Legros v New York Univ. Hosp. Center, 135 AD3d 196, 206 [1st Dept 2015] quoting Fletcher v Dakota, Inc., 99 AD3d 43, 51-52 [1st Dept 2012]). Once this minimal showing has been made, the burden shifts to the defendant to proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions (Koester v New York Blood Center, 55 AD3d 447, 448 [1 st Dept 2008] citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green, 411 US 792 [1973]). Although there may exist a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment action, if a Plaintiff can show that retaliatory animus was another motivating factor for the adverse employment action, he maintains a valid retaliation claim (Franco v Hyatt Corp., 189 AD3d 569, 571-572 [1st Dept 2020]). Evidence of an employer’s motives need not be direct, and the factfinder is entitled to ascertain an impermissible motive from circumstantial evidence (Reeves v Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 US 133 [2000]).
Here, Plaintiff engaged in protected activity by complaining to human resources on multiple occasions about Papyan’s alleged harassment. She suffered an adverse action – namely termination, approximately eight months after complaining. Despite knowing that Plaintiff complained about Papyan discriminating against her, Healthfirst relied on a performance evaluation authored by Papyan to justify her termination. These facts, coupled with the temporal proximity of her complaints and her lengthy tenure at Healthfirst require the jury to determine whether Plaintiff suffered retaliation.
The court additionally denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s sex-based discrimination and hostile work environment claims, but granted it as to plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.