In Tracey Ellis, Jamar Mattox, and Eric King v. Oak Lawn Hyundai, Inc., d/b/a Happy Hyundai and Delila Dedic, 2025 WL 1940375 (N.D.Ill. July 15, 2025), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss a plaintiff’s race-based hostile work environment claim.
From the decision:
In Count II, King brings a claim for hostile work environment under Title VII, § 1981, and the IHRA. [27] ¶ 285. To succeed on a hostile work environment claim, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he was subject to unwelcome harassment; (2) the harassment was based on race (or another protected category); (3) the harassment was severe or pervasive to a degree that altered the conditions of employment and created a hostile or abusive work environment; and (4) there is a basis for employer liability.” Robinson v. Perales, 894 F.3d 818, 828 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66–72 (1986)). In seeking to dismiss King’s hostile work environment claim, Happy Hyundai focuses on the first three elements; it mounts no argument regarding the fourth. See [32-1] at 4–5; [46] at 3–4.
Whether an environment is “hostile” or “abusive” is “determined only by looking at all the circumstances” including “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). Here, King plausibly states that his work environment had become “hostile” or “abusive” for the same reasons described above in the constructive discharge context. Other courts have found an actionable hostile work environment claim where a plaintiff alleges a supervisor referred to them as a “monkey.” See Holmes v. Austin, No. CV 23-2415 (LLA), 2024 WL 4345829, at *7 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2024); see also Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1297 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Given the history of racial stereotypes against African-Americans and the prevalent one of African-Americans as animals or monkeys, it is a reasonable—perhaps even an obvious—conclusion that the use of monkey imagery is intended as a racial insult where no benign explanation for the imagery appears.”) (cleaned up) (quoting United States v. Jones, 159 F.3d 969, 977 (6th Cir. 1998)). The case for a hostile work environment is also particularly strong here where a supervisor uses a racial epithet in front of subordinates. See Rodgers v. W.-S. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Perhaps no single act can more quickly alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment than the use of an unambiguously racial epithet … by a supervisor in the presence of his subordinates.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Robinson, 894 F.3d at 828–29.
Happy Hyundai counters that several of the incidents described in the complaint “weren’t even directed to [King].” [32-1] at 5. But while harassing comments directed at others may “carry less weight than remarks directed at the plaintiff,” they “may still be relevant to a hostile work environment claim.” Howard v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 989 F.3d 587, 601–02 (7th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up); see also Dandy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 388 F.3d 263, 272 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Repeated use of [racial epithets] in the work environment … may create an objectively hostile work environment, even if they are heard secondhand.”). Happy Hyundai does not explain why the comments toward others do not suffice under binding case law. Nor does it explain why the comments made toward King are not sufficient to state a hostile work environment claim on their own. C.f. Padron v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 12-CV-08089, 2017 WL 1208379, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2017) (“A single act of harassment may create a hostile work environment if it is sufficiently egregious.”). The Court finds the various allegations described above are enough—at least at this stage in the litigation—to plausibly allege that King was subject to a hostile work environment on account of his race. See Robinson, 894 F.3d at 828 (“Whether harassment was so severe or pervasive as to constitute a hostile work environment is generally a question of fact for the jury.”) (quoting Johnson v. Advoc. Health & Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 901 (7th Cir. 2018)).
Based on this, the court held that denial of the motion to dismiss was warranted.