In Pell v. Yonkers City School District, 2025 WL 2084739 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2025), the court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
From the decision:
Plaintiff’s Section 1981 is deficient because she does not plausibly allege facts that show her purported mistreatment was because of her race. Although discrimination in an employment context may implicate the right “to make and enforce contracts,” Plaintiff does not allege facts showing that there was interference with her contractual rights based on her race. Plaintiff only offers a bald assertion that her mistreatment was due to her race without providing the Court with further factual support that connects the two. These sorts of bare pleadings fail to meet Section 1981’s causation requirement.
“A plaintiff may raise such an inference by showing that the employer subjected him to disparate treatment, that is, treated him less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside his protected group.” Graham, 230 F.3d at 39. While “the plaintiff’s and comparator’s circumstances must bear a reasonably close resemblance,” they do not need to be “identical.” Hu, 927 F.3d at 96. A viable claim of disparate treatment requires facts sufficient to reasonably allow for the conclusion that the “[plaintiff] was similarly situated in all material respects to the individuals with whom she seeks to compare herself.” Id.
Here, Plaintiff’s complaint lacks specific allegations showing that her comparators are similarly situated in all material respects. Vague references to “other per diem substitutes”, (Opp. at 3), or general claims that “other Hispanic women”, (Id. at 4), faced similar treatment do not suffice. Without more facts, the Court cannot determine whether her comparators were “subject to the same standards governing performance evaluation and discipline.” See Brown, 756 F.3d at 230 (explaining that the judgment as to whether individuals are similarly situated depends on “whether the plaintiff and those [she] maintains were similarly situated were subject to the same workplace standards”) (quoting Graham, 230 F.3d at 40). Specifically, she fails to provide essential information regarding her alleged comparators’ pay rates, assigned schools, experience, job functions, qualifications, or other relevant factors. Absent such allegations, or other indicia of discrimination, Plaintiff’s claim rests on mere speculation and fails to raise a plausible claim of discrimination. See Mian, 7 F.3d at 1088 (dismissing § 1981 claim because “conclusory allegations” without specific facts evidencing discriminatory intent were insufficient).
Accordingly, dismissal was warranted.