In Hickman v. City of New York, No. 158494/2024, 2025 WL 2161731 (N.Y. Sup Ct, New York County July 30, 2025), the court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim of sex-based associational discrimination under the New York City Human Rights Law.
From the decision:
Even if not barred by the general release, Plaintiff’s associational discrimination claims fail as a matter of statutory construction. Section 8-107(20) of the CHRL prohibits discrimination “because of the actual or perceived race, creed, color, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, uniformed service or immigration or citizenship status of a person with whom such person has a known relationship or association.” Notably, the statute omits sex or gender as a protected basis for associational claims.
The doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius–the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of another–counsels against judicially inserting categories omitted by the Legislature (see Kimmel v. State of N.Y., 29 NY3d 386, 394 [2017]). Where, as here, the Legislature specifically enumerated protected categories but omitted others, courts may not imply a broader scope of liability (see also People v. Corr, 42 NY3d 668 [2024]). The legislative silence with respect to sex/gender association cannot be overlooked or judicially corrected.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim that he was discriminated against due to his relationship with Ms. Ahmad–who allegedly filed a sexual harassment complaint against Defendant Pagan–does not state a cognizable associational discrimination claim under the CHRL. Indeed, Plaintiff nowhere alleges he was targeted due to Ms. Ahmad’s race, creed, color, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or any other enumerated trait. He simply contends he was discriminated against because Ms. Ahmad is Ms. Ahmad.
Courts have recognized associational claims when the plaintiff is penalized for involvement with a protected class member. But no case holds that discrimination because of a relationship with a non-protected individual–here, a civilian woman–gives rise to liability. In the absence of any caselaw, such a claim is unprecedented and cannot survive even the liberal pleading standards cited above. To be sure, Plaintiff’s core theory–that he was singled out not for any protected characteristic of his partner but simply for “who he was sleeping with”–finds no parallel in the case law. In fact, the court is unaware of any New York case law extending the principle of associational discrimination where an individual is penalized for a relationship with a member of a protected class (for example, a man subject to adverse treatment because he is involved with another man), to situations in which the associate’s traits fall entirely outside the CHRL’s enumerated protections.
Section 8-107(20) of the CHRL expressly bars discrimination based on the actual or perceived race, creed, color, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, uniformed service or immigration status of one’s associate. It does not mention gender or sex, nor does it contemplate discrimination arising from association with a heterosexual or Muslim woman–or any non-enumerated category.
The court concluded that “[p]laintiff’s attempt to recast his claim as ‘sex/gender association’ thus directly conflicts with the statute’s plain terms, and no amount of amended pleading can rewrite the Legislature’s carefully chosen list of protected traits.”