In Parks v. Nordson Medical of NH Inc., 2025 WL 2177177 (E.D.Tenn. July 31, 2025), the court held that plaintiff’s allegations did not plausibly state a claim for sexual harassment, and therefore that the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 did not apply.
From the decision:
A court determines whether a hostile work environment has been created by looking at all the circumstances “including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Schelle v. City of Piqua, Ohio, No. 24-3980, 2025 WL 1592135, at *4 (6th Cir. June 5, 2025). The threshold for sexual harassment to constitute a hostile work environment is relatively high in the Sixth Circuit. Jones, 2024 WL 781040, at *3 (collecting cases). Title VII was not designed to “purge the workplace of vulgarity,” Black v. Zaring Homes, Inc., 104 F.3d 822, 826 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995)), and “simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious)” do not create an abusive work environment.
Plaintiff makes two factual allegations in support of her sexual harassment claim.1 First, Plaintiff alleges that, in March 2024, Atkins stated, “baby got back,” as Plaintiff began to sit down in a chair. (Doc. 13 at 3.) Second, Plaintiff alleges that, in May 2024, Atkins looked over at Plaintiff in the breakroom and began “gyrating his hips and pelvis area in front of [her], directly at [her] and began imitating that he was engaging in sexual intercourse.” (Id.)
Taking these allegations as true, Atkins’s comments and movements, although vulgar, do not meet the high threshold for sexual harassment. See Schelle, 2025 WL 1592135, at *4. The two incidents occurred two months apart, were limited to short periods of time, and were merely offensive in nature. This is insufficient to plead that she suffered from conduct that was so severe and pervasive to constitute an abusive work environment. See id. (citing Morris v. Oldham Cnty. Fiscal Ct., 201 F.3d 784, 792 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding allegations of sexual harassment, including a male supervisor making sexual advances on plaintiff and making several lewd jokes about her appearance including calling her “hot lips,” were not severe or pervasive enough to state a claim for relief)); see also Rayford v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 489 F. App’x 1, 5 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding comments made to a male employee three or four times per week, such as being called “sweet booty” and being told a co-worker “wanted to mix coffee with his cream” were not so severe and pervasive that a reasonable person would find his work environment hostile and abusive); and Breeden v. Frank Brunckhorst Co., LLC, No. 2:19-cv-2269, 2020 WL 1929344, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 21, 2020) (finding allegations of sexual harassment, including comments about seeing the plaintiff naked and getting a “boob job,” were not severe or pervasive enough to state a claim for relief).
The court concluded that “[b]ecause Plaintiff’s sexual-harassment allegations do not meet the threshold of stating a plausible claim for sexual harassment, the Court will not apply the EFAA” and further that “the parties agreed to arbitrate, Plaintiff’s claims are within the scope of the agreement, and the claims are arbitrable.”