In Udoh v. NYC Dept. of Probation, 24-cv-03982 (ER), 2025 WL 219961 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2025), the court dismissed plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, because plaintiff did not “administratively exhaust” that claim before the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
From the decision:
The Court finds that Udoh failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for his Title VII sex discrimination claim. “[E]xhaustion of administrative remedies through the EEOC stands as an essential element of Title VII’s statutory scheme, and one with which defendants are entitled to insist that plaintiffs comply.” Gibb v. Tapestry, Inc., No. 18 Civ. 6888 (LAP), 2018 WL 6329403, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2018) (quoting Francis v. City of New York, 235 F.3d 763, 768 (2d Cir. 2000)). Accordingly, “alleging Title VII claims in an EEOC charge is a ‘precondition to bringing such claims in federal court,’ unless the claims are ‘reasonably related’ to claims that were alleged before the EEOC.” Grant v. United Cerebral Palsy of New York City, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 00018 (LGS), 2014 WL 902638, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2014) (quoting Legnani v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., 274 F.3d 683, 686 (2d Cir. 2001)).
When Udoh filed his EEOC complaint, he did not list sex discrimination as a claim he was pursuing. Thus, the only way he can bring that discrimination claim in federal court is if it is “ ‘reasonably related’ to the claim filed with the agency.” Williams v. New York City Housing Authority, 458 F.3d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Butts v. City of New York Department of Housing Preservation and Development, 990 F.2d 1397, 1401 (2d Cir. 1993), superseded by statute on other grounds.). “[A] claim is considered reasonably related if the conduct complained of would fall within the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge that was made.” Id. at 70 (quoting Fitzgerald v. Henderson, 251 F.3d 345, 359–60 (2d Cir. 2001)). “The central question is whether the EEOC would have had adequate notice to investigate both the discrimination mentioned in the EEOC complaint and the discrimination that was not mentioned in the EEOC complaint.” Edwards v. New York State Unified Court System, No. 12 Civ. 46 (WHP), 2012 WL 6101984, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2012) (citing Williams, 458 F.3d at 70).6
The Court finds that the EEOC did not have adequate notice to investigate the sex discrimination claims. The EEOC charge makes no mention of “sex” at all. Udoh specifically alleges he was “discriminated against because of [his] race, national origin, disability, and retaliation for [his] complaints and oral and written requests for transfer,” but did not include sex. Doc. 26 at 35. The only related reference he makes merely states that a “female young officer under the age of 40 took [his] office the day [he] was asked to return all [his] equipment.” Doc. 26 at 35. That mention alone is insufficient to give the EEOC adequate notice to investigate a sex discrimination claim. See Parker v. Israel Discount Bank of New York, Inc., No. 21 Civ. 7196 (VEC), 2022 WL 16833626, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2022) (“[P]assing references to gender are inadequate.”); Holmes v. Fresh Direct, No. 13 Civ. 4657 (NGG) (CLP), 2015 WL 4885216, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2015) (holding that plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies in regards to her sex discrimination claim as nothing in the EEOC charge “mention[ed] conduct related to her sex.”).
Based on this, the court held that plaintiff’s Title VII sex discrimination claim must dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.