In Fernandez v. American Sugar Refining, Inc., 2025 WL 2294879 (E.D.La. Aug. 8, 2025), the court, inter alia, discussed and applied the “administrative exhaustion” requirement applicable to claims asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Initially, the court held that plaintiff did not administratively exhaust the sex-based discrimination claim:
Defendant contends aspects of Fernandez’s Title VII claim are not exhausted and, therefore, fail as a matter of law. An employment discrimination plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies before pursuing claims in federal court. Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378–79 (5th Cir. 2002). Exhaustion occurs when the plaintiff files a timely charge with the EEOC and receives a statutory notice of right to sue. Id. (citation omitted). Claim exhaustion, however, is circumscribed by the EEOC charge, which courts construe “in its broadest reasonable sense and ask whether the claim ‘can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.’ ” Davenport v. Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., 891 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir. 1970)). “Although verbal precision and finesse in the charge are not required, a Title VII lawsuit can include only those allegations that are like or related to those allegations contained in the EEOC charge and growing out of such allegations during the pendency of the case before the Commission.”
Plaintiffs attach Fernandez’s Right to Sue letter to their Complaint. (Rec. Doc. 1-2). To its instant motion, Defendant attaches Fernandez’s Charge of Discrimination. (Rec. Doc. 18-2). A court may take judicial notice of EEOC documents as a matter of public record when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 n.6 (5th Cir. 1994). Thus, this Court’s reference to EEOC documents does not convert Defendant’s motion into a motion for summary judgment. See Funk v. Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777, 780 (5th Cir. 2011).
In his EEOC charge, Fernandez lists “Disability, Race, [and] Retaliation” as bases of his complaint. (Rec. Doc. 18-2 at 2). Specifically, Fernandez alleges that racial discrimination led to his being given “a made-up job” so that he be excluded from White coworkers, that coworkers asked his opinion about a video entitled “N*****s for Trump,” that after Fernandez complained about false stories regarding his mental health he was required to undergo a mental evaluation, and that fellow coworkers generally did not want to work with him because of his race. Id. at 2–3. Plainly, any allegation of sex-based discrimination is absent in Fernandez’s allegations. Accordingly, sex-based discrimination cannot reasonably be expected to grow out of the EEOC charge, leading to the dismissal of that aspect of Fernandez’s instant claim for failure to exhaust.
The court reached a different conclusion, however as to plaintiff Fernandez’s hostile work environment and harassment claims:
Hostile work environment and harassment, however, present closer questions. Assuredly, neither are explicitly mentioned as a basis for the EEOC charge. “To state a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, the plaintiff must show that: (1) the victim belongs to a protected group; (2) the victim was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on a protected characteristic; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the victim’s employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action.” EEOC v. WC&M Enters., Inc., 496 F.3d 393, 399 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has described such harassment as “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment[.]” Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quotation omitted). This measure is assessed both subjectively and objectively. Id. at 22–23. Objective factors include “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Id. at 23.
Reading Fernandez’s EEOC charge in the broadest reasonable sense, this Court concludes that discrimination based on hostile work environment and harassment could reasonably be expected to grow out of the administrative allegations. Fernandez describes racism as the catalyst for escalating workplace stories by his coworkers which questioned his fitness for employment, and which in turn, led to job alterations, training refusals, and coworker avoidance. Thus, Fernandez has exhausted that aspect of his Title VII claim.
The court concluded that “although it is unclear if Fernandez’s claim has ultimate merit, this Court cannot say he has failed to administratively exhaust and, thereby, failed to state a claim for Title VII discrimination based on hostile work environment and harassment.”