In Laporte, Jose v. Sullivan, Brian, 1:24-cv-1124 (ECC/DJS), 2025 WL 2645531 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2025), the court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s – a dark-skinned Hispanic man – claim of race/national origin discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C § 1983.
From the decision:
Plaintiff argues that he was a member of a protected class based on his race/national origin, was qualified for the position of sergeant, experienced an adverse action when he was demoted from the sergeant position, and that his race was a motivating factor. Compl. at ¶¶ 42-43; Pl. Opp. at 9-10. For purposes of this motion, Defendant does not contest the first three elements, and argues only that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged discriminatory intent. Def. Mem. at 6.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant repeatedly expressed hostile attitudes towards racial minorities, including that “people like him don’t make good sergeants” when referring to Plaintiff. Compl. ¶¶ 24-28. Defendant argues that the statements are “too vague to establish racial bias.”4 Dkt. No. 12 at 5.
In Tolbert v. Smith, the Second Circuit addressed the issue of whether the plaintiff, a Black man who taught cooking classes at a public high school, had sufficiently established discriminatory motive in the decision to deny him tenure.5 790 F.3d 427 (2d Cir. 2015). The plaintiff “identified racially offensive comments allegedly made by” the principal less than one year before the district denied him tenure. Id. at 437. Specifically, the principal: (1) asked the plaintiff, “Do you only know how to cook black, or can you cook American too?” (2) asked a student “how [she] expected to learn if all [she] was learning to cook was black food,” and (3) told another student “black kids can’t learn in a cooking class because all they want to do is eat.” Id. at 437. The plaintiff also “submitted evidence” that the principal “changed the person who conducted [his] year-end evaluation without providing notice to [him].” Id. at 438.
The Second Circuit disagreed with the district court’s finding that the principal’s “stray remarks were too attenuated from the tenure decision and not probative of [the principal’s] intent.” Tolbert, 790 F.3d at 437. “The more remote and oblique the remarks are in relation to the employer’s adverse action the less they prove that the action was motivated by discrimination.” Id. (quotation omitted). “But there is no bright-line rule for when remarks become ‘too attenuated’ to be significant to a determination of discriminatory intent.” Id.
The Second Circuit concluded that the “irregularities” in the review process “when combined with [the principal’s] alleged remarks,” which were “made during a single school year” before the employment decision; “by the de facto decisionmaker;” “clearly suggest[ing] racial bias,” were “sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.”
Here, assuming the truth of Plaintiff’s allegations as required for a motion to dismiss, Defendant made racially offensive statements including statements of “people like him” and “those kinds of people,” and departed from the normal procedures for reviewing Plaintiff by changing the reviewer and not giving Plaintiff an opportunity to address performance issues. This is sufficient to allege discriminatory motive. See Tolbert, 790 F.3d 427; see also Stratton v. Dep’t for the Aging for City of New York, 132 F.3d 869, 879 n. 6 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Actions taken by an employer that disadvantage an employee for no logical reason constitute strong evidence of an intent to discriminate.”); George v. Roswell Park Cancer Inst. Corp., No. 1:22-cv-1006, 2025 WL 2208427 at *13 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2025) (Supervisor’s comment that “[Y]ou people from South India are dark-skinned and you should not have low Vitamin-D levels” was “sufficiently probative of discrimination to support [plaintiff’s] ‘minimal’ burden at this stage of the case.”).
Plaintiff also points to the more favorable treatment two “Caucasian” sergeants received. Pl. Opp. at 12-13. The parties disagree about whether they are sufficiently similar to Plaintiff to support an inference of discrimination. Id.; Dkt. No. 12 at 7-9. Given that “the question whether two employees are similarly situated” is normally “a question of fact for the jury,” George, 2025 WL 2208427 at *11 (quotation omitted), and Plaintiff’s other allegations of discriminatory motive, this issue will not be resolved at this stage of the litigation.
Based on this, the court concluded that plaintiff introduced sufficient evidence to meet his minimal burden of suggesting an inference of discriminatory motivation, amounting to a “mosaic” of evidentiary fragments.