In Carter-Marks v. Alstom Transport USA Inc., 2025 WL 2680998 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2025), the court, inter alia, granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim of hostile work environment asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
This decision illustrates the principle, cited often by courts, that actions that might be deemed “hostile” in the general sense will not necessarily constitute a “hostile work environment” as that term is used in employment law.
From the decision:
Title VII does not impose ‘a general civility code for the American workplace.’ ” McNamara, 748 F. Supp. 3d at 89 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998)); Russo, 972 F. Supp. 2d at 447 (“While ‘the central statutory purpose [of Title VII was] eradicating discrimination in employment, Title VII does not set forth a general civility code for the American workplace.’ ” (quoting Redd v. New York Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166, 176 (2d Cir. 2012))). Examples of conduct prohibited by Title VII include: “sexual assaults; [other] physical contact[, whether amorous or hostile, for which there is no consent express or implied]; uninvited sexual solicitations; intimidating words or acts; [and] obscene language or gestures.” Redd, 678 F.3d at 177 (citations omitted) (alterations in original). Conduct that does not fall under Title VII’s protection include “occasional vulgar banter, tinged with sexual innuendo, of coarse or boorish workers,” see id., as well as “rudeness and excessive criticism of a plaintiff or her work.” Saraceni v. Retting, 726 F. Supp. 3d 101, 122 (N.D.N.Y. 2024) (citing Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 321).
Here, Plaintiff’s opposition does not even recount the necessary elements for a hostile work environment claim, let alone apply those standards to the instant case. Dkt. No. 45 at 5-8. Nonetheless, reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, she still fails to offer sufficient evidence to create a dispute of material fact that might warrant denial of Defendants’ motion. The vast majority of Plaintiff’s allegations amount to the sort of conduct that Title VII does not protect, even when construing the record in the light most favorable to her. For instance, Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Mass frequently “glared at [her] in a menacing way,” “looked very upset,” looked at Plaintiff with an “angry intimidating stare and scowl,” or otherwise exhibited an “angry” demeanor causing Plaintiff to feel intimidated given his physical size, stature, and personality; that he “micromanage[d] her work schedule”; that Mr. Mass excluded Plaintiff from work meetings; and that Mr. Mass made improper sexual insinuations and innuendos when interacting with Plaintiff and the IT technician. Dkt. No. 45-2 at 5-6, 8-12, 14-16.
Courts have frequently found similar allegations insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 321 (finding allegations that supervisor made negative statement about the plaintiff to others, being impatient and using harsh tones, increasing the plaintiff’s schedule, and wrongfully reprimanding the plaintiff did not amount to a hostile work environment); Fleming v. MaxMara USA, Inc., 371 F. App’x 115, 119 (2d Cir. 2010) (rejecting claims of wrongful exclusion from meetings, excessive criticism of her work, refusal to answer work-related questions, imposition of arbitrary duties, and sending rude emails sufficient to establish a hostile work environment); Redd, 678 F.3d at 177 (“[V]ulgar banter, tinged with sexual innuendo” are insufficient to satisfy the standard); Garcia v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 19-CV-997 (PAE), 2019 WL 6878729, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2019) (finding no hostile work environment where supervisor yelled at the plaintiff multiple times and called him a slur); Kenny v. Catholic Charities Cmty. Servs. Archdiocese of New York, 20-CV-3269 (PAE) (RWL), 2023 WL 1993332, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2023) (stating that “a supervisor’s rudeness to an employee does not equate to a hostile work environment under Title VII”).
Similarly, Plaintiff’s alleges that Mr. Mass and Mr. Ragusa both intimidated her on multiple occasions by interacting with her in close proximity without wearing masks, and that Mr. Mass would slam her doors which “put[ ] [her] in fear for [her] safety.” Dkt. No. 45-1 at 4, 6-7, 11, 14. Apart from the conclusory and unsupported nature of the claims, the allegations “are neutral as to [Plaintiff’s] [race and sex]” and Plaintiff “ha[s] pointed to no record evidence supporting the inference that the abovementioned incidents of alleged mistreatment occurred ‘because of’ any of [her] protected characteristics.’ ” Alvarado, 631 F. Supp. 3d at 120 (quoting Petrisch v. HSBC Bank USA, Inc., No. 07-CV-3303 (KAM) (JMA), 2013 WL 1316712, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013)). Because it is “axiomatic that to prevail on a claim of hostile work environment based on [protected status], the plaintiff must establish that the abuse was based on her [protected status],” Plaintiff’s failure to do so here warrants summary judgment in Defendants’ favor. See Kaytor v. Elec. Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 547 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Small v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 650 F. Supp. 3d 89 102 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (rejecting hostile work environment claim where the plaintiff failed to establish that the conduct exhibited towards him was based on a protected characteristic); Conklin v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 661 F. Supp. 3d 239, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (“Mistreatment, however severe, does not constitute a Title VII violation without evidence that Plaintiff’s protected characteristic was the reason for the treatment.”).
Based on this, the court held that summary judgment on plaintiff’s Title VII hostile work environment claim was warranted.