In Thompson v. Douglas A. Collins, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 22-CV-4732 (EK)(SDE), 2025 WL 2962734 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2025), the court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s gender-based discrimination (failure to promote, transfer) claims asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
On a failure-to-promote claim, “it is not enough for the plaintiff simply to allege that [s]he was qualified for a position but did not get it.” Ghosh v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., No. 21-CV-6139, 2023 WL 3612553, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 3746617 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2023). Instead, she must plausibly allege “that the employer took adverse action against her at least in part for a discriminatory reason.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 87 (2d Cir. 2015).
Here, Thompson’s complaint says virtually nothing that would permit an inference of discrimination. She refers, in the midst of a long list of conclusory fragments, to defendant Carballo having denied her “promotions, training, and pay opportunities as that of [her] white male counterparts.” Compl. Supp. 5. Her opposition brief does not go meaningfully farther: there, she states that she “applied on several occasions for the Property Manager (NX) position and continued to be non-selected where the job was canceled each time [she] applied, and 2 males were hired who were not more qualified than [her].” Pl. Opp’n 5; see also id. at 6 (“I was not given fair pay or equal pay as my white male co-workers nor the appropriate fair evaluations where I outperformed my coworkers.”).So the record is devoid of any factual content supporting the inference that Carballo was motivated by discriminatory animus. Moreover, plaintiff does not indicate when she applied for the position she was denied. Absent clarity concerning whether she applied before or after Carballo’s report, the report cannot form the basis for an inference of discrimination.
In the end, plaintiff’s threadbare allegations do not clear the relatively low bar set by the Second Circuit in Vega and Littlejohn (or by the Supreme Court in Iqbal and Twombly). See Ghosh, 2023 WL 3612553, at *10 (“While the plaintiff’s initial pleading burden as to the necessary discriminatory intent is low, it is not non-existent.”); Moss v. Bd. of Educ. of Brentwood Sch. Dist., No. 23-CV-6571, 2025 WL 1548945, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. May 30, 2025) (dismissing discrimination claims where complaint contained “no factual allegations suggesting Defendants’ selection of [someone else] for the Principal position instead of Plaintiff had any nexus whatsoever to Plaintiff’s race”).
On the lateral transfer, Thompson again pleads no facts that give rise to an inference of gender-based discrimination. Although she indicates that the transfer was involuntary, she does not allege (even in her brief) any facts that suggest it was because of her gender — just that Ingino decided to reassign her “suddenly” and that the decision was “unfair[ ].” Pl. Opp’n 5.
Based on this, the court held that dismissal was warranted.