In Granger v. City of Anderson Transit System, No. 1:23-CV-01548-JPH-TAB, 2025 WL 3199889 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 17, 2025), the court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s sex- and race-based hostile work environment claims asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
As to plaintiff’s sex-based claim, the court explained:
CATS argues that Mr. Jones calling Ms. Granger a “bitch” one time is not severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment. Ms. Granger responds that along with this incident, Mr. Stanley also called Ms. Granger a “bitch” to her face, and those actions were “well beyond abusive and would likely be abusive by any reasonable person’s standards.”
Here, the designated evidence shows that at most, Ms. Granger was called a “bitch” twice. Dkt. 49-1 at 228, 230. There is “no magic number of incidents required to establish a hostile environment.” Boumehdi v. Plastag Holdings, LLC, 489 F.3d 781, 789 (7th Cir. 2007). However, the Seventh Circuit has consistently required more than two sex-based comments to show a hostile work environment. See Patt v. Fam. Health Sys., Inc., 280 F.3d 749, 754 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding “eight gender-related comments” over plaintiff’s multi-year employment “were too isolated or sporadic to constitute severe or pervasive harassment”); Mercer v. Cook County, 527 F. App’x 515, 521 (7th Cir. 2013) (collecting cases and holding sexually explicit graffiti and eight other incidents— including being called “bitch” twice—was not severe or pervasive enough); cf. Boumehdi, 489 F.3d at 786–89 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding “at least eighteen sex-based comments” over ten months was severe and pervasive enough to survive summary judgment). So, while “[t]here is no question that gender-based comments and epithets, when used pervasively in the workplace, can meet the standard for severe or pervasive harassment,” Passananti v. Cook Cnty., 689 F.3d 655, 668 (7th Cir. 2012), the designated evidence here that she was called or referred to as a “bitch” twice over the course of Ms. Granger’s multi-year employment with CATS weighs against finding that she was subjected to a hostile work environment.
Further, nothing in the designated evidence suggests Mr. Stanley’s and Mr. Jones’s remarks were related. Instead, they were isolated incidents and offhand comments that do not amount to a hostile work environment. See Patt, 280 F.3d at 754; see also Baskerville v. Culligan Intern. Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 1995) (“A handful of comments spread over months is unlikely to have so great an emotional impact as a concentrated or incessant barrage.”). Here, Mr. Stanley and Mr. Jones’ use of the term “bitch” to refer to Ms. Granger occurred months apart from each other. Dkt. 49-1 at 228, 230. And the incidents occurred in different contexts, with Mr. Stanley speaking directly to Ms. Granger after a union meeting and Mr. Jones saying it on a voicemail recording to a third party. Id. That weighs further against finding that Ms. Granger endured a hostile work environment.
Moreover, neither incident involved Ms. Granger’s direct supervisor calling her a “bitch.” Dkt. 49-1 at 228. “The conduct of a non-direct supervisor or a department lead . . . should undoubtedly be given more weight than an employee’s co-equal.” Scaife, 49 F.4th at 1117 (discussing use of racial slurs). But “a harasser who has direct supervisory control over an employee continues to maintain more weight in the analysis” than either a non-direct supervisor or a co-equal. Id. Although Mr. Jones was a supervisor at CATS, the designated evidence shows that he had a non-direct supervision role over Ms. Granger, as Jim Carpenter and Barbara Johnson were her direct supervisors. See dkt. 49-1 at 38. So, that lack of direct supervisory control by either Mr. Jones or Mr. Stanley is yet “another weakness” in Ms. Granger’s claim. Scaife, 49 F.4th at 1117 (holding department lead’s use of racial epithet outside plaintiff’s presence was not severe enough to survive summary judgment); Anderson, 104 F.4th 646 (affirming summary judgment for defendants because manager calling employee a “bitch” did not amount to a severe and pervasive work environment).
Finally, Mr. Jones also did not call Ms. Granger a “bitch” to her face. Dkt. 49-1 at 228. “[R]emarks that are stated directly to the plaintiff weigh heavier than when a plaintiff hears them secondhand.” Scaife, 49 F.4th at 1116 (discussing secondhand racial epithet). Ms. Granger learned about Mr. Jones’ comment secondhand from a passenger’s voicemail. Dkt. 49-1 at 224. For that reason, Mr. Jones’ comment carries less weight than it would if, for example, Mr. Jones called Ms. Granger a bitch in the presence of her and other employees.
(Cleaned up.)
The court concluded that plaintiff “has not designated evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude she was subjected to conduct objectively severe or pervasive enough to constitute a sex-based hostile work environment” and “does not designate evidence or offer any explanation as to how the incidents she raises relate to her race, so she has not met her burden as to any race-based hostile work environment claim, either.”