In Sheehan v. Everstory Partners et al, No. CV 24-6581, 2025 WL 3727863 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 2025), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s hostile work environment sexual harassment claims.
As to one plaintiff, the court explained:
Defendants argue that the Amended Complaint fails to allege the first element of a facially plausible hostile work environment claim on behalf of Hernandez because its allegation that “Lebisky would frequently make sexual comments to Plaintiff Hernandez such as ‘[Plaintiff Hernandez], your tits look great” (Am. Compl. ¶ 39 (emphasis omitted)) is insufficient to support a reasonable inference that Hernandez suffered intentional discrimination because of her sex. We note that, while this is the Amended Complaint’s only allegation of a sexually harassing remark made directly to Hernandez by Lebisky, it is not the only allegation of a sexually harassing remark or sexually harassing conduct that Hernandez personally experienced or witnessed, or of which she was aware. As we described above, the Amended Complaint alleges that some of the Plaintiffs heard Sobon and Lebisky “refer to a female employee as a ‘cunt’ and a ‘useless bitch’ ” and that all of the Plaintiffs were aware of these remarks. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34-35.) All of the Plaintiffs are also alleged to have witnessed Lebisky making frequent comments that the building in which they worked was “ ‘nothing but a fucking sorority.’ ” (Id. ¶ 38.) Lebisky frequently said, in front of all Plaintiffs that Heydorn “could crush his head with her thighs.” (Id. ¶¶ 41-42 (emphasis omitted).) The Amended Complaint also alleges that Hernandez saw the Fatal Attraction picture, the Lift 5000 incident, and the underpants incident. (See id. ¶¶ 44, 46, 47-51.) The Amended Complaint also alleges that “[a]ll Plaintiffs were adversely affected by the aforementioned hostile work environment on the basis of sex.” (Id. ¶¶ 110, 114 (emphasis omitted).) Viewing these allegations of the Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to Hernandez, we conclude that the Amended Complaint plausibly alleges that Hernandez was subjected to intentional sexual harassment and thereby satisfies the pleading requirement for the first element of a hostile work environment claim on her behalf. We therefore deny the Motion to Dismiss with respect to this argument.
Defendants also argue that the Amended Complaint fails to plausibly allege the second element of a hostile work environment claim, i.e., that Hernandez suffered sexual harassment that was severe or pervasive. The Supreme Court has explained that the “ ‘severe or pervasive’ ” standard “is an objective standard, based on ‘an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive.’ ” Tourtellotte v. Eli Lilly & Co, 636 F. App’x 831, 846 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S.17, 21 (1993)). “To determine if the alleged harassment is so hostile or abusive to rise to the level of an unlawful hostile environment, the Supreme Court directs courts to ‘look[ ] at all the circumstances,’ including the frequency of the alleged conduct.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23) (citation omitted). “ ‘The question of whether an environment is sufficiently hostile or abusive must be judged by looking at all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.’ ” Flores v. Charlton, Civ. A. No. 17-4848, 2019 WL 3801951, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2019) (quoting Moody, 870 F.3d at 215). “ ‘Isolated incidents and offhanded comments … are not sufficient to sustain a hostile work environment claim,’ ‘even if they engender offensive feelings in an employee.’ ” Id. at *4 (alteration in original) (first quoting Stucke v. City of Phila., 685 F. App’x 150, 153 (3d Cir. 2017); then quoting Greer v. Mondelez Global, Inc., 590 F. App’x 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2014)).
As we discussed in the preceding paragraph, the Amended Complaint alleges that “Lebisky made frequent sexual comments to Hernandez such as ‘[Hernandez] your tits look great.’ ” (Am. Compl. ¶ 39 (emphasis omitted).) Defendants argue that this allegation is insufficient to allege frequency because it does not specify “the actual frequency or dates of the alleged comments” and suggest that Lebisky only made this comment once, which, while inappropriate, would not be sufficient to establish a hostile work environment. (Defs. Mem. at 24.) However, when we apply the 12(b)(6) standard, “ ‘all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint must be taken as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and all inferences must be drawn in favor of them.’ ” St. Luke’s Health Network, Inc. v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 967 F.3d 295, 299 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009)). The Oxford English Dictionary defines “frequently” as “[a]t frequent or short intervals, often, repeatedly.” Oxford English Dictionary, https://www.oed.com/dictionary/frequently_adv?tab=meaning_and_use#369 9174 (last visited Dec. 2, 2025). This established definition thus allows for the reasonable inference that Lebisky made these comments significantly more than once, and we reject Defendants’ contrary assertion. Viewing the allegations of frequency in the Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to Hernandez, we conclude that these allegations satisfy the frequency aspect of the severe or pervasive requirement. Moreover, while Lebisky’s comments may not have been physically threatening, they were clearly humiliating and more than mere offensive utterances. See Flores, 2019 WL 3801951, at *3. We therefore conclude that these allegations support a reasonable inference that the harassment of Hernandez was severe as well a frequent. For these reasons, we conclude that the Amended Complaint plausibly pleads the second element of a hostile work environment claim with respect to Herandez, and we deny the Motion to Dismiss with respect to this argument.
As noted above, in order to satisfy the third and fourth elements of a hostile work environment claim, the Amended Complaint must plausibly allege that the sexual harassment detrimentally affected Hernandez and that this conduct “ ‘would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like circumstances.’ ” Moody, 870 F.3d at 213 (quoting Mandel, 706 F.3d at 167) (citation omitted). Defendants contend that the Amended Complaint fails to satisfy these factors. The Amended Complaint specifically alleges that all of the Plaintiffs were adversely affected by the hostile work environment. (Am. Compl. ¶ 110.) Moreover, we easily conclude that the allegations of Lebisky’s frequently repeated comments that the Plaintiffs’ workplace was “a fucking sorority,” that Hernandez’s “tits look great,” and that Heydorn could crush his head with her thighs, together with the Fatal Attraction picture and the Lift 5000 and underpants incidents, give rise to an inference that a reasonable person in like circumstances would have been detrimentally affected. See Mandel, 706 F.3d at 161, 168 (finding that an objectively reasonable person could be offended by comments made by supervisors who referred to a female employee as “ ‘darling,’ ‘the woman,’ ‘fluffy,’ ‘missy,’ ‘hon,’ and ‘toots’; having her body, clothing, and physical appearance commented on; being told that she was ‘foolish not to use [her] assets … [and] being told [by a manager] that he fantasized about her while he was having sex with his wife” (first alteration in original)). We thus conclude that the Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges the third and fourth elements of a hostile work environment claim on behalf of Hernandez and we deny the Motion to Dismiss with respect to this argument.
(Cleaned up.)
Accordingly, having rejected defendants’ arguments that plaintiff’s complaint fails to plausibly allege a claim of hostile work environment against defendant Everstory, it denied defendants’ motion to dismiss.