In Walker v. Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, No. 160839/2021, 2025 WL 3757595 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 23, 2025), the court, inter alia, denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s race and gender discrimination, and hostile work environment, claims.
From the decision:
The Court rejects Defendants’ argument that there is no evidence of discrimination. Gallo-Kotcher was the subject of a prior race discrimination complaint based on a comment made to a Black intern leading to her being reprimanded by the MTA’s agency head and general counsel. There is evidence of gender-based animus from Muallem based on the sworn testimony of Plaintiff and Jean-Pierre. Finally, there is an issue of fact as to whether Muallem physically struck Plaintiff and, if he did, whether it was based on racial and/or gender animus.
Moreover, there is no requirement that there be direct evidence of racial and gender-based animus to sustain a discrimination claim so long as there is evidence which gives rise to an inference of discrimination (see, e.g. Hribovsek v United Cerebral Palsy of N.Y. City, 223 AD3d 618, 619-20 [1st Dept 2024]). The circumstantial evidence, corroborated by multiple witnesses, creates issues of fact as to whether Defendants’ actions give rise to an inference of discrimination.
Defendants’ reliance on the same actor inference is not dispositive. While Muallem and Gallo-Kotcher were involved in hiring Plaintiff, based on the lapse in time between Plaintiff’s hiring and the allegedly discriminatory acts, a jury could reasonably conclude there was a change in circumstances or attitudes from the time Plaintiff was hired to when Plaintiff began to suffer the allegedly discriminatory actions (see Tirschwell v TCW Group Inc., 194 AD3d 665, 666 [1st Dept 2021]). Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff failed to show a proper comparator because Miyashiro was not similarly situated is likewise a fact issue for the jury. Miyashiro and Plaintiff held the same job title and shared similar duties and responsibilities. Further, the New York City Human Rights law does not require the comparator to be identical in job title and duties to Plaintiff, all that is required is a showing that because of Plaintiff’s protected characteristics, she was treated less well than other employees who do not share those protected characteristics (see Suri v Grey Global Group, Inc. 164 AD3d 108, 117 [1st Dept 2018] citing Williams v New York City Hous. Auth., 61 AD3d 62, 78 [1st Dept 2017]).
The court further held that issues of fact preclude summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claims, noting that “[v]iewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, and given the witnesses’ diametrically opposed versions of events, it is for a jury to determine whether the scrutiny, scolding, alleged humiliation at proceedings, dismissive remarks, and alleged physical violence was so severe and pervasive to give rise to a hostile work environment.”