In Daryl Whitfield v. Kristi Noem, No. 2:25-CV-04499-HDV-PDX, 2026 WL 1270812 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2026), the court held that plaintiff sufficiently alleged race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s SAC does not state a racial discrimination claim because it is not supported by any evidence that gives “rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination” to establish a prima facie case. Motion at 4.
To prove a claim for racial discrimination under Title VII, Plaintiff must allege (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for his position and performing satisfactorily, (3) he experienced an adverse employment action, and (4) similarly situated individuals outside his protected class were treated more favorably, or other circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.” Hawn v. Executive Jet Mgmt. Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2010). A Plaintiff need not plead facts constituting all elements of a prima facie case of discrimination to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002) (“The prima facie case … is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.”).
Instead, an employment discrimination complaint “must contain only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Id. at 508; Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2). “Rule 8(a) establishes a pleading standard without regard to whether a claim will succeed on the merits.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515. Nonetheless, courts have looked to elements of a prima facie case “to analyze a motion to dismiss, so as to decide, in light of judicial experience and common sense, whether the challenged complaint contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” See Achal v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 781, 796-97 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Albro v. Spencer, No. 1:18-cv-01156-DAD-JLT, 2019 WL 2641667, at *6 (E.D. Cal. June 27, 2019).
Applying this standard, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient for pleading purposes. The SAC avers that “Defendant has a pattern of excluding African American male employees from telework and favorable assignments,” and “Plaintiff was denied accommodations and telework routinely granted to similarly situated non-Black employees, constituting disparate treatment.” SAC ¶¶ 26–27. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) includes additional detail about the alleged pattern of discrimination in the workplace:
Over more than a decade, Plaintiff has observed that very few African-American males have been hired into his role. Those who have been hired report experiences of racial exclusion, retaliation, and lack of advancement, indicating systemic bias in CBP’s hiring and promotion practices in violation of Title VII.
FAC ¶ 21. Although this earlier language is not included in the SAC, the Court considers it as additional context to support the principal allegation that Defendants’ purported denial of Plaintiff’s telework accommodation request was based on impermissible racial considerations.
In summary, the Complaint states a claim for racial discrimination under Title VII. Plaintiff alleges his membership in a protected class, avers his satisfactory performance and a specific adverse employment action, and pleads a factual comparator involving non-African American co-workers. Contrary to Defendants’ protestations, Plaintiff is not required to provide “evidence” in a Complaint to survive a pleading challenge. The allegations are plausible and no more is required at this stage of the litigation.
This decision is thus instructive as to the differences between the necessary showing for pleading a race discrimination claim, on the one hand, and proving such a claim, on the other.