In Melton v. I-10 Truck Ctr. Inc., No. 23-14175, 2026 WL 319183 (11th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit vacated the lower court’s decision awarding defendant summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim of a racially hostile work environment under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
From the decision:
To prevail on a claim against his employer for a racially hostile work environment, an employee must first prove that “he is a member of a protected class,” and that he was subjected to “unwelcome” harassment “based on his race.” Adams v. Austal, U.S.A., L.L.C., 754 F.3d 1240, 1248–49 (11th Cir. 2014). He then must prove “that the harassment was severe or pervasive enough to alter the terms and conditions of his employment.” Id. at 1249. Finally, he must prove that “the employer is responsible for the environment.” Id. We have been clear that “the objective element” of the “severe or pervasive” inquiry is “not subject to mathematical precision,” but is judged “from the circumstantial facts.” Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1297 (11th Cir. 2009).
An employee may prevail by showing “[e]ither severity or pervasiveness.” Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 808 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). An environment may be unlawfully hostile “even if the racial remarks were not directed at [the employee].” Edwards v. Wallace Cmty. Coll., 49 F.3d 1517, 1522 (11th Cir. 1995). Nevertheless, as Title VII “is not a civility code,” mere profanity does not suffice to show a hostile environment unless, “viewed cumulatively,” the vulgarity amounts to race-based harassment. Reeves, 594 F.3d at 807.
I-10 meaningfully contests only whether the harassment Melton faced was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of his employment. Melton points to Andrews’s use of the term “boy” in the April 9 conversation, the use of racial slurs and other derogatory language in reference to dark-skinned customers, and the fact that Andrews did not want to serve nonwhite customers whom he either ignored or sent to Melton. Together, this evidence is enough for a jury to infer a hostile workplace environment.
A jury could reasonably find that Andrews used the term “boy” as a racial slur. We have held that “boy” can be a racial slur when directed at an adult black man. See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 664 F.3d 883, 897–98 (11th Cir. 2011). Since a “speaker’s meaning may depend on various factors including context, inflection, tone of voice, local custom, and historical usage,” whether this use was racially charged is a question the jury could decide either way. Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456 (2006). But one instance of a racist comment does not itself render a workplace hostile unless the comment is sufficiently severe to make up for the absence of pervasiveness. See Adams, 754 F.3d at 1254 (holding that an isolated act could assist in establishing hostility because “it was severe”); cf. Castleberry v. STI Grp., 863 F.3d 259, 264 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that “one such instance” of a supervisor’s use of the n-word “can suffice to state a claim”). Here it is not, and so we turn to the other evidence.
A jury could also reasonably rely on the evidence of pervasive hostility toward nonwhite customers. The district court ruled out Melton’s statements about these comments because they were “vague as to frequency or pervasiveness.” It is true that we have previously rejected harassment claims for insufficient specificity. See Yelling, 82 F.4th at 1335. But where we have done so, it has been because the employee suggested vaguely that racist comments had been made multiple times. Id. Melton, in contrast, has provided specific evidence that the Brigmans and Andrews routinely used racial slurs toward dark-skinned customers and made other, charged comments about them in his presence. They described Indians as “dot heads” and Middle Easterners as “rag heads,” and used other racial slurs to describe Asian and Hispanic customers. Melton states that employees’ use of racial slurs was a “normal practice” at I-10, since it occurred “nearly every time” a nonwhite customer entered, which happened “frequently.” This evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that these comments were pervasive.
The jury would be on firm ground to infer from these comments that Andrews and the Brigmans were hostile to all dark-skinned or nonwhite customers and employees. Hostile work environment claims turn on “a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed.” Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82. Because Melton was the only nonwhite employee at I-10, he was forced into an out-group—one that could have included any nonwhite person, who would in turn have been targeted based on his or her race. In that environment, the routine targeting of any nonwhite customer by a dominant white majority could reasonably make the environment hostile for a black employee. Our conclusion is reinforced by the fact that Andrews and the Brigmans regularly confirmed that their prejudices extended to black customers, by questioning the source of a black customer’s money “[n]early every time” a black customer paid with cash. And in using a racial slur to his face, Andrews confirmed what a reasonable person in his position could have concluded long ago: that Melton too was disfavored because of his race.
To be clear, we do not adopt a categorical rule that any minority employee alleging a hostile work environment may rely on remarks targeted at other racial minorities. Instead, we hold only that when an employee belongs to a minority group relative to his specific workplace, the treatment of other non-majority groups may evidence a strong racial preference for the workplace majority such that all minorities are racially disfavored. In that environment, prejudice against other minority groups can evidence the workplace majority’s in-group preference, which in turn results in out-group bias. Employees must still establish that they were subject to at least some harassment based on their own race. Title VII is not a “civility code” to save employees from offense at the vulgarity and cruelty of others. Reeves, 594 F.3d at 807. But it protects Melton when he faces a workplace majority’s racial bias.
Melton has also provided other evidence that he was treated differently in a racially charged way. He has stated that Andrews attempted to avoid serving nonwhite customers and tried to force Melton to serve them instead. This practice provides evidence of prejudice directly against him. And evidence that Melton was referred to with racist language behind his back adds to the credibility of his allegations. Although we do not consider “other employees’ experiences of which [Melton was] unaware” in establishing the hostility of a workplace, Adams, 754 F.3d at 1250, these experiences support an inference that Melton was telling the truth about the racist comments and actions he witnessed.
Melton has also provided substantial evidence that his performance at work was affected. He declared that the offensive remarks made by Andrews and the Brigmans were “a source of stress and anxiety that made it more difficult for [him] to do [his] job.” A jury is entitled to credit his testimony, especially when I-10 has not disputed it. The district court questioned this assertion because “Melton’s sales performance was unaffected and largely consistent through his entire employment.” But a jury could infer that the harassment affected Melton’s performance throughout his employment or prevented him from improving his performance.
The court concluded that since plaintiff provided substantial evidence to put that question to a jury, the district court erred in granting summary judgment against his claim of a hostile work environment.