In Krcishta v. 1745 East 12th Street LLC, No. 523841-2017, 2026 WL 416309 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 11, 2026), the court, inter alia, denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s claims for disability discrimination and failure to accommodate disability under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws.
From the decision:
An employer normally cannot obtain summary judgment on an employment discrimination claim based on disability pursuant to NYSHRL “unless the record demonstrates that there is no triable issue of fact as to whether the employer duly considered whether a requested accommodation would allow an employee to continue, and the employer cannot present such a record if the employer has not engaged in good-faith interactions with the employee revealing at least some deliberation upon the viability of the employee’s request (Jacobsen v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 22 N.Y.3d at 837, 988 N.Y.S.2d 86, 11 N.E.3d 159; Cohen v. State of New York, 129 A.D.3d 897, 899, 10 N.Y.S.3d 628). Such a good-faith interactive process is also required by the more protective NYCHRL, and its absence represents a violation of New York City Administrative Code § 8-107(15)(a) (Phillips v. City of New York, 66 A.D.3d 170, 176-77, 884 N.Y.S.2d 369, 374). Thus, to prevail on a summary judgment motion with respect to a claim for disability discrimination pursuant to NYSHRL and the NYCHRL, the employer must demonstrate as a matter of law that it engaged in a good-faith interactive process that assessed the needs of the disabled individual, and the reasonableness of the accommodation requested (see Jacobsen v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 22 N.Y.3d at 837, 988 N.Y.S.2d 86, 11 N.E.3d 159). Under the NYCHRL, “[a]n employer has a duty to move forward to consider accommodation once the need for accommodation is known or requested” (9 NYCRR 466.11[j][4]).
The record reveals starkly different accounts of the communications between the parties following the Plaintiff’s injuries, creating material issues of fact that preclude summary judgment. Defendants assert that no formal request for accommodation was ever made and that their interaction with the Plaintiff on January 3, 2016–consisting of David Landau advising the Plaintiff to “relax himself” and “be careful”–fulfilled any obligation to discuss whether he could continue in his role as superintendent with reasonable accommodations. They further contend the Plaintiff’s only specific demand was for Workers’ Compensation Board (WCB) documentation.
Plaintiff’s account suggests that the Defendants were aware of the need for accommodation, regardless of whether one was explicitly requested. Plaintiff testified that following his second injury on January 23, 2016, he directly informed David Landau that he “don’t do the garbage,” a task he identified as an essential function of his role. The record indicates that Plaintiff’s wife visibly assumed these physical chores, an arrangement that Landau was not only aware of this arrangement but never questioned.
The quality and sincerity of any interactive process or cooperative dialogue is deeply in dispute. While Defendants characterize their response as supportive, the Plaintiff alleges that on January 3, 2016, the Defendants “mocked” his injuries, suggested he visit a vet instead of a medical doctor, and spoke in a foreign language to exclude him from the discussion. These allegations, if proven, would directly subvert the requirement of a good-faith deliberative process.
Notably, as stated above, under the NYCHRL, the obligation to engage in a good-faith interactive process to determine if an employee’s injuries prevent him from performing his job functions is triggered once the employer knows of the need for an accommodation, even if a formal accommodation is not officially requested.
Clearly, given the facts and circumstances of this case, the Court finds that are triable issues of fact as to whether Plaintiff requested a reasonable accommodation, whether the defendants were aware of Plaintiffs need for an accommodation, and whether there was a good-faith interactive process between the Plaintiff and Defendants to see a reasonable accommodation would have allowed plaintiff to retain in his role of Superintendent.
Based on this, the court held that denial of defendants’ motion was warranted.