In Nielsen v. Seven Seventeen Credit Union, Inc. et al, No. 4:24-CV-00579, 2026 WL 554525 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 27, 2026), the court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s quid pro quo sexual harassment claim asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Initially, the court held that plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege quid pro quo sexual harassment in her complaint. It continued to explain, however:
Even if the Court considered arguendo her quid pro quo harassment claim, Plaintiff has not shown by any evidence other than base assertion that Defendant Locastro’s conduct was unwanted or unwelcome:
Q: …All of the documents that you produced so far, none of them indicate in any way that you wanted him to stop or you didn’t want to send him pictures or anything to that effect?
A: No. I don’t believe any of them state that, no.
Q: Okay. And likewise, there’s no communications from him where he said that he would fire you or demote you if you didn’t send a picture?
A: No.
Nielsen Dep. Tr., ECF No. 69–2 at PageID ##: 636:25–37:9. On the contrary, Plaintiff admits that, on at least one occasion, she walked into Defendant Locastro’s office uninvited and tried to kiss him, causing him to back away because he was in the middle of a work call. See Nielsen Dep. Tr., ECF No. 69–2 at PageID ##: 668:12–69:15. She also attempted to kiss Defendant Locastro on the dance floor at a company Christmas party, again prompting him to push her away. See Locastro Dep. Tr., ECF No. 73–3 at PageID #: 1433:11–20. These incidents cut against the elemental sufficiency needed for her claim to survive summary judgment.
Accordingly, because Plaintiff (a) failed to sufficiently plead a claim of quid pro quo harassment, (b) impermissibly tried to raise that claim for the first time in response to Motions for Summary Judgment, and (c) cannot demonstrate there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Defendant Locastro’s conduct was unwanted, Defendant 717 is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Count II.
The court also dismissed plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim, noting that while plaintiff sufficiently alleged this claim in her complaint, she abandoned that claim in her summary judgment opposition.