In Schulman v. The Department of Education of the City of New York, No. 24 CIV. 8322 (AT), 2026 WL 573298 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2026), the court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s employment discrimination claim.
This decision provides an instructive overview of the “adverse employment action” element of this cause of action. From the decision:
The Court finds that Schulman has not plausibly alleged an adverse employment action for the purposes of her disparate treatment claim. The Second Circuit has described an adverse employment action as a “materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment.” Vega, 801 F.3d at 85 (quotation omitted). It must be “more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.” Id. (quotation omitted).
First, “disciplinary write-ups or negative evaluations are not adverse actions sufficient to support a discrimination claim unless they affect the employee’s terms of conditions of employment (e.g., reducing wages, disqualifying plaintiff from a promotion opportunity, or leading to demotion or termination).” Singa v. Corizon Health, Inc., No. 17 Civ. 4482, 2018 WL 324884, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2018); see also Tepperwien v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 663 F.3d 556, 570 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that “criticism of an employee (which is part of training and necessary to allow employees to develop, improve, and avoid discipline) is not an adverse employment action” (quotation omitted)). Schulman does not allege that the negative write-ups affected her pay, led to her demotion, or anything similar. See Singa, No. 2018 WL 324884, at *4. Therefore, she does not plausibly allege that these constitute adverse actions.
Second, the “withholding of resources, without more, does not constitute an adverse employment action.” Byas, 2025 WL 963977, at *10 (internal quotation marks omitted). Schulman merely alleges that the principal denied her “media art technology, and a textbook request for visual arts expenditures.” Id. ¶ 42. Increased scrutiny is not an adverse employment action either. See Field v. Tonawanda City School Dist., 604 F. Supp. 2d 544, 556 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[C]hanges in teaching assignments and additional administrative scrutiny of their work, without more, fail as a matter of law to establish an adverse employment action.”); see also Dimitracopoulos v. City of N.Y., 26 F. Supp. 3d 200, 213 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Scheduling and assignment issues involving course loads are generally not considered materially adverse employment actions.”). Nor is the failure to take action with respect to difficult students. See Jenkins v. Bd. of Educ. of City of N.Y., 64 F. App’x 801, 804 (2d Cir. 2003) (“While Plaintiff[ ] alleges that [the principal] did not remove the disproportionate number of ‘problem’ students from his class, standing alone, this does not constitute an adverse employment action.”).
A “[d]enial of training,” however, “can constitute an adverse employment action where it bear[s] on either plaintiff’s opportunities for professional growth and career advancement or directly on plaintiff’s compensation.’ ” Hill v. Rayboy-Braustein, 467 F. Supp. 2d 336, 353 (S.D.N.Y 2006) (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). But Schulman’s allegations that the denial of training opportunities stalled her career or deprived her of income-generating opportunities are conclusory and non-specific. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 47. Schulman does not identify what opportunities she was excluded from, allege that she would have otherwise been able to participate in them, or explain how they are connected to the loss of income, career stagnation, or missed promotional opportunities. See id.; Hill, 467 F. Supp. at 353 (“When an employee cannot show material harm from a denial of training, such as failure to promote or a loss of career advancement opportunities, there is no adverse employment action.”).
Finally, Schulman has not plausibly alleged that her voluntary resignation amounts to a constructive discharge. “Under the constructive discharge doctrine, a voluntary resignation will not preclude a finding of an adverse employment action if the plaintiff can show that ‘the employer … deliberately [made] working conditions so intolerable that the employee [was] forced into an involuntary resignation.’ ” Chanval Pellier v. Brit. Airways, Plc., No. 02 Civ. 4195, 2006 WL 132073, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2006) (alterations in original) (quoting Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir.1983)). “The Second Circuit has strictly construed the standard for determining whether working conditions are intolerable,” holding that the proper test is not “merely whether the employee’s working conditions were difficult or unpleasant.” Stembridge v. City of N.Y., 88 F. Supp. 2d 276, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). The Supreme Court has suggested that constructive discharge is a “worst case” harassment scenario, a hostile working environment “ratcheted up to the breaking point.” Penn. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 147–48 (2004). “Without an actionable hostile environment claim, [a] plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim must also fail.” Ferraro v. Kellwood Co., No. 03 Civ. 8492, 2004 WL 2646619, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2004) (citation omitted). Thus, because Schulman fails to state a hostile work environment claim, her constructive discharge claim is not viable.
Based on this, the court concluded that plaintiff’s complaint does not plausibly allege an adverse employment action within the limitations period, warranting dismissal of her disparate treatment claim.