In Schiavoni v. Scott J. Marn et al, No. 1:24-CV-2090, 2026 WL 1601246 (N.D. Ohio June 4, 2026), the court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s hostile work environment claims asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, since this claim was not administratively exhausted at the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
From the decision:
Because the EEOC Charge did not expressly include a claim for hostile work environment, it could only satisfy the exhaustion requirement for Plaintiff’s instant hostile work environment claims if those claims were “reasonably related to or could have grown out of the factual allegations in the charge.” Russ v. Memphis Light Gas & Water Div., 720 F. App’x 229, 238 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Younis, 610 F.3d at 362). Reviewing the EEOC Charge, the Court finds that the EEOC and OCRC were not put on sufficient notice of Plaintiff’s instant hostile work environment claims. “Though the captions outlining her EEOC charge are not dispositive, they are some evidence of which claims [Plaintiff] was seeking to pursue before the EEOC.” Scott v. Eastman Chem. Co., 275 F. App’x 466, 474 (6th Cir. 2008).
In the EEOC Charge, Plaintiff alleges that she filed a sexual harassment complaint for a subordinate employee, since that filing she has been subjected to harassment, “including but not limited to, being ridiculed, belittled, and embarrassed in council meetings by Scott Marn and Matthew Donovan[,]” and she was informed she “would be collateral damage and possibly discharged because of [her] age.” (ECF No. 41-3, PageID #535). It then specifically alleges: “I believe I was discriminated against because of my age, Year of Birth:1957, and retaliated against for engaging in a protected activity, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended.” (Id. at PageID #536).
The EEOC Charge explicitly states a claim for age discrimination and retaliation. Although it sets out specific acts of harassment (ridicule, belittlement, and embarrassment by Marn and Donovan at council meetings), there is no allegation or indication that Plaintiff personally suffered discrimination based on her gender or sex. Moreover, the allegations of those discrete acts of harassment are insufficient to raise a hostile work environment claim in an EEOC charge because they do not demonstrate sufficient pervasive discriminatory conduct. See Younis, 610 F.3d at 362 (“[T]he inclusion in an EEOC charge of a discrete act or acts, standing alone, is insufficient to establish a hostile-work-environment claim for purposes of exhaustion.”); Hayes v. Clariant Plastics & Coatings USA, Inc., 144 F.4th 850, 865 (6th Cir. 2025). Although Plaintiff’s footnote points to other alleged instances of gender-related discrimination and retaliation by Defendants, these factual allegations were not included in the EEOC Charge (as noted by Defendants). (ECF No. 41-1, PageID #525–26).
The Court finds that it was not reasonable to expect the EEOC and OCRC to investigate any claims of hostile work environment because such claims did not naturally grow out of the age discrimination and retaliation claims alleged in the EEOC Charge. Nor is there any evidence that the EEOC or the OCRC actually investigated Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claims. See Scott v. Eastman Chem. Co., 275 F. App’x 466, 474–75 (6th Cir. 2008).
Accordingly, the court found that plaintiff did not exhaust her hostile work environment claims, and thus dismissed those claims without prejudice.