In Matima v. Bytedance Inc. et al, No. 25 CIV. 10213 (PAE), 2026 WL 2676497 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2026), the court, inter alia, held that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged sexual harassment under the New York City Human Rights Law, and therefore, under the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (the “EFAA”), denied defendant’s motion to compel arbitration.
After concluding that plaintiff’s complaint alleges two acts that continue the course of sexual harassment (and are thus properly considered under the continuing violation doctrine), it assessed whether plaintiff’s claim is plausible:
Viewing its allegations in totality, the FAC plausibly alleges that Adjamian treated his ByteDance subordinate Matima less well because of her gender, as required for liability under the NYCHRL.
As pled, Adjamian’s conduct towards Matima progressed from unwanted sexualized attention, to expressions of sexual interest, to sexual propositions, and ultimately, to veiled threats of adverse professional consequences if Matima continued to reject his advances. See FAC ¶¶ 18–27. This behavior tracks that cited in cases sustaining such claims under the NYHCRL, including Adjamian’s ogling and commenting on Matima’s appearance, see, e.g., Diaz-Roa, 757 F. Supp. 3d at 518, commenting on her attire, see, e.g., Santana v. Latino Express Restaurants, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 3d 285, 289–90 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), and asking about her relationship status and propositioning her, including outside her hotel room late at night, see, e.g., Johnson, 657 F. Supp. 3d at 543, 555. These allegations are also sufficiently “gender-charged” to support the required inference of discriminatory motivation. See, e.g., Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 113–15; Gaughan v. Rubenstein, 261 F. Supp. 3d 390, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (supervisor’s “remarks about Plaintiff’s appearance and using her femininity to successfully carry out certain job responsibilities, create[ ] a minimal inference that Plaintiff was subject to differential treatment on the basis of her gender”); Carter v. Verizon, No. 13 Civ. 7579, 2015 WL 247344, at *9–12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2015) (supervisor’s placing hands on employee’s shoulders fairly construed as “gender charged”). Indeed, at the pleading stage, an explicit or implicit sexual proposal by a man to a woman or vice-versa creates a “presumption that the conduct occurred because of gender differences.” Johnson, 657 F. Supp. 3d at 55 (quoting Nachmany v. FXCM, Inc., No. 16 Civ. 225, 2020 WL 178413, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2020).
To be sure, the FAC lacks some allegations commonly noted in decisions upholding such NYCHRL claims. It does not claim that Adjamian sent Matima sexually explicit images, see, e.g., McHenry, 510 F. Supp. 3d at 69–70 (text messages); engaged in repetitive or long-lasting behavior towards her, see, e.g., Mitura, 712 F. Supp. 3d at 450 (“dozens if not hundreds of disparaging” communications on a “weekly basis”); or made physical contact with her, see, e.g., Girardi, 2023 WL 2744027, at *1 (touched plaintiff’s hair and rubbed her ears and shoulders), let alone a combination of these, Baldwin v. TMPL Lexington LLC, No. 23 Civ. 9899, 2024 WL 3862150, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (plaintiff was “groped” against her will for months and “repeatedly” asked out). But the NYCHRL does not require those specifics. And, depending on the facts pled, the requirement that the plaintiff have been “treated less well than other employees because of her gender,” Mitura, 712 F. Supp. 3d at 453 (quoting McHenry, 510 F. Supp. 3d at 66), can be met by “[a] single comment.” Id at 461; see also Shukla v. Deloitte Consulting LLP, No. 19 Civ. 10578, 2020 WL 3181785, at *11 (S.D.N.Y, June 15, 2020). Here, the FAC alleges considerably more: a series of unwanted advances and threats. Taken as true, those allegations plausibly state a claim for sexual harassment under the NYCHRL.
The FAC also alleges the “sexualized content required to constitute sexual harassment under the EFAA.” Montanus, 2025 WL 2503326, at *7. That distinction matters because the EFAA, by its terms, does not reach claims of gender discrimination, but only claims of sexual harassment, a particular form of gender discrimination involving unwanted, gender-based verbal or physical contact. See 9 U.S.C. § 401(4); Lane, 2026 WL 2364630, at *6 (sexual harassment is a subcategory of gender-based discrimination requiring more “than simply alleging that a plaintiff was ‘treated less well than other employees because of [ ] gender’ ” (internal citation omitted)); Toomey, 2026 WL 458244, at *4 (“[T]he EFAA exempts claims relating to sexual harassment and sexual assault, only.”); Smith, 2025 WL 2782484, at *8 (“[R]egardless of the source of law, sexual harassment must be sexual in nature.”). Here, the FAC’s allegations go well beyond mere differential treatment on account of gender to centrally include sexualized attention, a proposition for sex, and a veiled threat of reprisal following the denial of sex, i.e., continuing to play “hard to get.” FAC ¶ 27. Those allegations are ample to bring this case within the EFAA. See, e.g., Johnson, 657 F. Supp. 3d at 554–56 (sustaining invocation of EFAA where, as pled, plaintiff’s supervisor made sexual advances and pressured him to have sex with colleagues, including herself); Nunez, 2015 WL 4605684, at *11 (sustaining NYCHRL claim where supervisor repeatedly reached out to plaintiff to invite her to movies or plays, said he was “infatuated” with her, and warned that if she did not go on dates with him, he would force her to perform time-consuming work).
Defendants counter by attacking Matima’s credibility. ByteDance terms the FAC’s allegations a “complete sham,” and argues that, had her account of sexual harassment been truthful, she would have included it in her internal complaints or in her EEOC Charge, none of which alleged sexual advances or a proposition for sex. Reply at 4–5. Adjamian and Fayad make a similar argument. Fayad Mem. at 22; Adjamian Mem. at 21. Those challenges to credibility, however, although appropriate at trial, are not proper at the pleading stage. See Oakley v. Dolan, No. 17 Civ. 6903, 2020 WL 818920, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2020), rev’d in part on other grounds, 980 F.3d 279 (2d Cir. 2020) (plaintiff’s “credibility and motivations in bringing suit are not relevant on a motion to dismiss”); Whitcombe v. Lanza Corp., No. 20 Civ. 4835, 2022 WL 597438, at *6 (February 28, 2022) (“[T]he Court cannot—and will not—wade into fact and credibility determinations on a motion to dismiss.”); Tescher v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., No. 21 Civ. 2266, 2022 WL 564048, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2022) (same). And a plaintiff is not barred from alleging facts in a complaint merely because she did not previously report them in an internal workplace complaint or administrative charge. Yost, 657 F.Supp.3d at 568. The Court’s charter at this stage is merely to determine whether the factual allegations in the FAC, taken as true, plausibly state a claim. DiFolco, 622 F.3d at 113 (“In ruling on a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the duty of a court is ‘merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof.’ ” (quoting Cooper v. Parsky, 140 F.3d 433, 440 (2d Cir. 1998)).
Matima therefore has pled a viable claim of sexual harassment under the NYCHRL.
(Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.)
Having concluded that plaintiff plausibly alleged a claim of sexual harassment, the court concluded that her arbitration agreement was unenforceable as to any of the claims in this case.