In Hall v. New York City Department of Education, 23-cv-10385 (JGK), 2024 WL 4979288 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2024), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s failure-to-hire claim asserted under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
From the decision:
The plaintiff asserts that the defendant retracted her job offer and failed to hire her because of her disability, caregiver status, and requests for an accommodation, in violation of Title I of the ADA.
Title I of the ADA makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate in hiring decisions “against a qualified individual on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Employment discrimination claims brought pursuant to the ADA are governed by the burden-shifting standard established for Title VII claims in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See, e.g., McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 2013). Under the McDonnell Douglas evidentiary framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506–07 (1993). The ADA requires four elements to establish a prima facie case giving rise to a temporary presumption of discriminatory motive. See Kinneary v. City of New York, 601 F.3d 151, 158 (2d Cir. 2010). The plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) her employer is subject to the statute, (2) she suffers from a disability or is perceived to suffer from such a disability within the meaning of the statute, (3) she could perform the essential functions of the job with or without a reasonable accommodation, and (4) she suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability. See, e.g., McMillan, 711 F.3d at 125; Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 531 F.3d 127, 134 (2d Cir. 2008).
However, at the pleading stage, “an employment discrimination plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002). Rather, to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff “need only give plausible support to a minimal inference of discriminatory motivation.” Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 2015); Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 84 (2d Cir. 2015). At this stage, the elements of a prima facie case “provide an outline of what is necessary to render a plaintiff’s employment discrimination claims for relief plausible.” Sommersett v. City of New York, No. 9-cv-5916, 2011 WL 2565301, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2011). With respect to the final element, a plaintiff must show that the adverse employment action ‘took place under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.
The defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the FAC’s allegations regarding the first three elements of the plaintiff’s prima facie case. Instead, in seeking to dismiss the plaintiff’s ADA failure-to-hire claim, the defendant argues that the FAC fails to allege plausibly that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability.
But plainly, the FAC pleads nonconclusory facts that “giv[e] rise to an inference of discrimination.” Davis, 804 F.3d at 235 (quoting Graham, 230 F.3d at 39). During the September 9, 2022 phone call, Weathers allegedly expressed concerns about the plaintiff’s request to be accompanied by her trained guide dog at work. These comments are indicative of discriminatory animus in the hiring process. Weathers’s comments signal that the defendant retracted the plaintiff’s job offer because of the plaintiff’s request to have her guide dog accompany her to work, an accommodation that must be accepted as reasonable at this stage. See 42 U.S.C. 12111(9). And retracting the plaintiff’s job offer because of her request for a reasonable accommodation is an adverse employment action with a plausible causal nexus to the plaintiff’s disability.
[Internal quotation marks and citations omitted]
Based on this, the court held that plaintiff’s complaint was sufficient to state a failure-to-hire claim pursuant to Title I of the ADA.