In Acosta v. Kennedy Children’s Center, 24 Civ. 3358, 2025 WL 70141 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2025), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s disability discrimination claims asserted under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL).
From the decision:
KCC next disputes that Acosta suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability.5 Acosta’s termination was the quintessential adverse employment action. See Robinson v. Dibble, 613 F. App’x 9, 12 (2d Cir. 2015) (termination constituted “adverse employment action”); Reilly, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 544 (“[T]ermination constitutes adverse employment action.”). And the inference that Acosta’s termination resulted from her perceived PTSD easily follows from the pleadings here.
An inference of discrimination can arise from circumstances including “the sequence of events leading to the plaintiff’s discharge,” Littlejohn v. City of N.Y., 795 F.3d 297, 312 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted), including the temporal proximity between disclosure of the disability and the termination, see, e.g., Farmer v. Shake Shack Enters., LLC, 473 F. Supp. 3d 309, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (collecting cases). Here, the short (one-week) passage between, on the one hand, Acosta’s disclosure of her condition and request for accommodation, and, on the other, her termination, powerfully support the inference of discrimination. Indeed, KCC’s human resources director, Milian, told her within one hour of her requesting a reasonable accommodation that the request was denied and she was being terminated. See AC ¶¶ 28–29. The case law reflects that a causal inference based on temporal proximity may arise even when the gap between such events is two months long. See, e.g., Dooley, 636 F. App’x at 21 (unpaid suspension two months after employer’s learning of disability and termination one-and-a-half months thereafter supported inference of discrimination under ADA); Beanchine v. City of Syracuse, 21 Civ. 845, 2024 WL 2700874, at *27 (N.D.N.Y. May 24, 2024) (denial of promotion two months after disability discrimination complaint supported inference of causal connection). And, the AC alleges, during the conversation in which Acosta was terminated, KCC’s executive director, Alter, overtly referenced Acosta’s disability and demand for accommodation. Alter stated: “I’m a businesswom[a]n[,] not an expert[,] but it seems like you have PTSD and you need help.” Id. ¶ 35. She added that “there was no way to grant [Acosta] an accommodation without a mental health diagnosis.” Id. ¶ 36.
Based on this, the court concluded that plaintiff’s complaint “clearly alleges facts supporting the inference that KCC terminated Acosta based on her disability” and denied the motion to dismiss plaintiff’s ADA claims.
Having reached this conclusion as to plaintiff’s federal (ADA) claims, it likewise reached the same conclusion as to plaintiff’s claims under the NYSHRL (which are governed by the same standards applicable to the ADA) and the NYCHRL (which provides “greater protection” than the ADA or the NYSHRL).