In Matlock v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois, 2025 WL 1359068 (N.D.Ill. May 9, 2025), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s age-based hostile work environment claim.
From the decision:
The next question is whether, considering the above evidentiary limitations, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that she was subjected to a hostile work environment because of her race, gender or age. To state a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (2) the harassment was based on a protected characteristic; (3) the harassment was severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create a hostile or abusive working environment; and (4) there is a basis for employer liability. Alamo v. Bliss, 864 F.3d 541, 549 (7th Cir. 2017) (elements under Title VII); Dandy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 388 F.3d 263, 271 (7th Cir. 2004) (elements under Section 1981); Brooks v. Avancez, 39 F.4th 424, 441 (7th Cir. 2022) (elements under the ADEA). Whether the workplace is hostile depends on the totality of the circumstances, including “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Alamo, 864 F.3d at 549–50. Although “a workplace need not be ‘hellish’ to constitute a hostile work environment, a hostile work environment must be so pervaded by discrimination that the terms and conditions of employment are altered.” Id.
While the dispute between the parties centers on whether the conduct was severe or pervasive, the Seventh Circuit has found it “premature at the pleadings stage to conclude just how abusive [a plaintiff’s] work environment was.” Huri v. Off. of the Chief Judge of the Cir. Ct. of Cook Cnty., 804 F.3d 826, 834 (7th Cir. 2015). Instead, this Court focuses on whether a plausible allegations of abusiveness have been pled. Id. In making this determination, the Court is mindful of Rule 8’s “undemanding standard” of notice pleading. See Tate v. SCR Medical Transp., 809 F.3d 343, 346 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008) (discussing how complaint that puts defendant on fair notice of a claim “need not allege all, or any, of the facts logically entailed by the claim and it certainly need not include evidence.”)
Beginning with the hostile work environment claim in Count VII, which alleges an agebased pressure campaign to get Plaintiff to retire in order to placate a younger colleague, the Court finds that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a claim.2 Depending upon how frequent, pointed, and offensive the retirement comments were – which facts Plaintiff need not detail in her complaint – such conduct could conceivably rise to the level of a hostile work environment. The Court therefore denies the motion to dismiss as to Count VII.
The court further held that plaintiff did not sufficiently allege a hostile work environment based on race and gender, but likewise sufficiently alleged a hostile work environment claim based on race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.