In Wallace v. Chris Wright, Secretary of Energy, No. CV 24-2906 (SLS), 2025 WL 3042025 (D.D.C. Oct. 31, 2025), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim of retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act.
From the decision:
To state a retaliation claim under the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must allege that: “(i) she engaged in statutorily protected activity; (ii) she suffered a materially adverse action by her employer; and (iii) a causal link connects the two.” Doak v. Johnson, 798 F.3d 1096, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). At the motion to dismiss stage, “the issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002); see also Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“[T]o survive a motion to dismiss, all the complaint has to say is [that] the [defendant] retaliated against me because I engaged in protected activity.” (cleaned up)).
Here, Ms. Wallace’s allegations satisfy all three elements. First, she alleges that she made “weekly accommodation requests” during the period in which she was recovering from surgery. Compl. ¶ 50. Second, her termination was an obviously adverse employment action. And third, Ms. Wallace’s allegations support a reasonable inference that her termination was connected to her protected activity. This inference is supported by temporal proximity because Ms. Wallace’s termination occurred within approximately two months of her becoming disabled and requesting accommodation. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Peters, 482 F.3d 521, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (temporal proximity can “support an inference of causation … where the two events are ‘very close’ in time” (quoting Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273–74 (2001))). This inference is also supported by Ms. Wallace’s allegations that her supervisors did not like that she needed to telework because of her medical condition and that she was unable to participate in previously scheduled work travel. Compl. ¶ 28.
The court concluded that while plaintiff “may not ultimately prevail on her retaliation claim … she has sufficiently alleged that she engaged in protected activity and that DOE terminated her as a result” which is sufficient to survive dismissal.