In Estep v. Brenner, No. 159639/2022, 2025 WL 3312877 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 24, 2025), the court denied plaintiff’s motion to amend their complaint to add a cause of action for race-based discrimination and hostile work environment under federal law (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), following the dismissal of plaintiff’s claim under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL).
Specifically, plaintiff sought to amend the complaint after receiving a Title VII claim after receiving a notice of right to sue from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC):
From the decision:
Under NYSHRL, a “racially hostile work environment exists ‘[when] the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment’ ”. (Forrest 3 N.Y.3d at 310; quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 [1993]). The standard for a hostile work environment claim under NYSHRL is the same as the standard under Title VII. (See Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 123-24 [2d Cir. 2013]; Forrest 3 N.Y.3d at 310). Plaintiff’s cause of action for a hostile work environment under NYSHRL was dismissed because Plaintiff could not make a showing that the treatment he experienced was so “severe or pervasive” that it altered the conditions of his employment, or created an objectively abusive working environment.
Contrary to Plaintiff’s position, Title VII claims are not held to the same standard as those under New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL). Rather, “… courts must analyze NYCHRL claims separately and independently from any federal and state law claims.” (Mihalik v Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F3d 102, 108-09 [2d Cir. 2013]). Claims brought under NYCHRL are to be liberally construed. (Williams v New York City Hous. Auth., 61 AD3d 62, 66 [1st Dept 2009]). Due to this liberal reading of NYCHRL, Plaintiff’s causes of action for discrimination and hostile work environment under NYCHRL were not dismissed.
Although CPLR § 3025 (b) freely permits the amendment of a pleading, in considering the proposed amendment to the pleading, a court must consider whether the amendment is meritorious and sufficient. (see Mendoza v Akerman Senterfitt LLP, 128 AD3d 480 [1st Dept 2015]; see Cafe Lughnasa Inc. v A & R Kalimian LLC, 176 AD3d 523 [1st Dept 2019]). “Where…the proposed amendments are totally devoid of merit and are legally insufficient, leave to amend should be denied.” (Heller v. Louis Provenzano, Inc., 303 AD2d 20, 25 [1st Dept 2003] quoting Zahas by Zabas v Kard, 194 AD2d 784 [2d Dept 1993] internal citations omitted).
As Plaintiff’s causes of action for discrimination and hostile work environment under NYSHRL were previously dismissed on the merits, Plaintiff cannot now reintroduce the same cause of action, against the same parties, with the same burden of proof. (See Aspen Specialty Ins. Co. v RLI Ins. Co., Inc., 194 AD3d 206, 212 [1st Dept 2021], citing Brownrigg v New York City Hous. Auth., 29 AD3d 721, 722[2d Dept. 2006]).
The court concluded that since plaintiff’s discrimination and hostile work environment claims under NYSHRL have already been dismissed, and plaintiff’s proposed Title VII claims “are premised upon the same standard and burden of proof as those previously dismissed,” denial of plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint was warranted.