In Goldzweig v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., No. 25-0089-CV, 2026 WL 21005 (2d Cir. Jan. 5, 2026), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, inter alia, affirmed the court’s award of summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff’s retaliation claims asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the New York State Human Rights Law, but but vacated the court’s summary judgment dismissal under the more lenient New York City Human Rights Law.
From the decision:
Goldzweig’s claims under the NYCHRL are evaluated separately from federal and state law claims, and under a more liberal standard. An NYCHRL discrimination claim requires a plaintiff to allege that she was “treated less well than other employees because of” a protected characteristic. Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). “[A] defense motion for summary judgment must be analyzed under both the McDonnell Douglas framework and the mixed motive framework, which imposes a lesser burden on a plaintiff opposing such a motion.” Ellison v. Chartis Claims, Inc., 178 A.D.3d 665, 668 (2d Dep’t 2019) (cleaned up). Likewise, an NYCHRL retaliation claim requires a plaintiff to prove that her employer’s conduct “was caused at least in part by retaliatory motives.” Ya-Chen Chen v. City Univ. of N.Y., 805 F.3d 59, 76 (2d Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). “[S]ummary judgment is still appropriate in NYCHRL cases, but only if the record establishes as a matter of law that a reasonable jury could not find the employer liable under any theory.” Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 113.
We conclude, as the district court did, that Goldzweig’s discrimination claims fail under the NYCHRL. As described above, Con Edison put forward ample evidence of a nondiscriminatory motivation, including, but not limited to, performance reviews, emails documenting her performance and conflict with outside counsel, testimony from multiple of her supervisors, and testimony from outside counsel, all corroborating its basic argument about Goldzweig’s performance. Even under the NYCHRL’s more liberal standards, summary judgment is appropriate in the face of this unrebutted evidence because Goldzweig has produced no “evidence that defendant’s explanations were pretextual, nor any evidence that a discriminatory motive coexisted with the legitimate reasons supported by defendant’s evidence.” Bennett v. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 92 A.D.3d 29, 46 (1st Dep’t 2011).
As to Goldzweig’s NYCHRL retaliation claim, however, we conclude that the district court failed to conduct the separate and independent analysis that the city law requires. The district court reasoned that “[t]he NYCHRL is slightly more solicitous of retaliation claims than federal and state law because, rather than requiring a plaintiff to show an adverse employment action, it only requires action that was ‘reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging in protected activity.’ Otherwise, the burden shifting framework is the same under the NYCHRL as under [federal and state law].” Goldzweig v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., No. 20-cv-4297, 2024 WL 5056350, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2024) (internal citation omitted). This overlooks important differences relevant to Goldzweig’s NYCHRL retaliation claim.
The NYCHRL takes a broader approach than Title VII or the ADEA as to what constitutes a protected activity for the purpose of a retaliation claim. When the district court concluded that only one of Goldzweig’s four complaints qualified as a protected activity under federal law, it did not consider that under the NYCHRL, this issue is interpreted “broadly in favor of discrimination plaintiffs, to the extent that such a construction is reasonably possible.” Albunio v. City of New York, 16 N.Y.3d 472, 477-78 (2011). Moreover, retaliation claims under state and federal law require a plaintiff to show “but for” causation, “which requires that the adverse action would not have occurred in the absence of the retaliatory motive.” Lively v. WAFRA Inv. Advisory Grp., Inc., 6 F.4th 293, 307 (2d Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted) (ADEA retaliation); Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360 (2013) (Title VII retaliation). But under the NYCHRL, a plaintiff “need not prove that the reason proffered by the employer for the challenged action was actually false or entirely irrelevant” to the decision to take adverse action. Melman v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 98 A.D.3d 107, 127 (1st Dep’t 2012); see also Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 116. Again, the district court did not address these different causation standards when discussing Goldzweig’s NYCHRL retaliation claim.
As a result, “we cannot confidently conclude that the district court analyzed plaintiff’s NYCHRL [retaliation] claim under the standard applicable thereto.” Velazco v. Columbus Citizens Found., 778 F.3d 409, 411 (2d Cir. 2015).
Based on this, the court vacated the portion of the district court’s judgment related to Goldzweig’s NYCHRL retaliation claim and remand for the district court to determine whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this claim, and if it does so, to consider the claim under the appropriate standard, separate and apart from the federal and state claims.