In Egan v. Ballantyne Country Club, No. 3:25-CV-00373-KDB-DCK, 2026 WL 377867 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 11, 2026), the court, inter alia, dismissed plaintiff’s claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
In her next claim, Egan alleges that BCC violated Title VII when Dougherty made sexually explicit comments about her to other members of the management team and later invited her to dinner—after his termination—at a business event both were scheduled to attend. As courts have explained, “[q]uid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when a supervisor demands sexual consideration in exchange for job benefits,” Twine v. AT&T, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 3d 959, 972 (E.D. Va. 2024) (quoting Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983)) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), and “consists of conditioning employment benefits upon the employee’s submitting to the sexual advances or threatening adverse employment actions if the employee does not submit.” Schulze v. Meritor Auto., 163 F. Supp. 2d 599, 610 (W.D.N.C. 2000).
To state such a claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment occurred because of her sex; (4) her response to the harassment affected a tangible aspect of her “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment;” and (5) “the employer knew or should have known of the harassment” and failed to take remedial action. Twine, 755 F. Supp. 3d at 972 (quoting Nixon v. Kysela Pere et Fils, Ltd., No. 22-1406, 2024 WL 3666166, at *5 (4th Cir. Aug. 6, 2024)) (citation omitted).
A “tangible employment action” refers to a significant change in employment status, including “hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Okoli, 648 F.3d at 222 (quoting Burlington Indust., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)). Perhaps the clearest example of quid pro quo harassment is when a supervisor tells a subordinate, “I will fire you unless you sleep with me.” Briggs v. Waters, 484 F. Supp. 2d 466, 479 (E.D. Va. 2007) (citation omitted).
Here, Egan has plausibly alleged the first three elements of a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim. However, Egan has not plausibly alleged the remaining elements. Egan asserts that Dougherty, by virtue of his supervisory role, had the ability to control the terms and conditions of her employment. But she does not allege that he, or BCC, ever exercised that authority in a manner that altered, threatened, or even implicated any concrete term or condition of her employment.
Egan further contends that her “reaction to the alleged sexual harassment affected tangible aspects of her employment.” Doc. No. 10 ¶ 56 (emphasis added). Yet the only reactions she identifies are feeling humiliated and choosing to report the conduct and later resign. Although she characterizes her resignation as a constructive discharge, she pleads no facts, as explained above, to suggest that BCC rendered her working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee in her position would have felt compelled to quit. Instead, she offers only the conclusory assertion that she was “forced to work in a hostile work environment” and therefore “forced” to resign. Doc. No. 10 ¶ 48.
Egan likewise fails to allege that BCC failed to take remedial action in response to her report. To the contrary, the Amended Complaint reflects that the company acted promptly and decisively by terminating Dougherty shortly after receiving her complaint.
Based on this, the court held that dismissal was warranted.