In McFarlane v. Community Health Center of Richmond, Inc., No. 25-CV-00410 (NCM) (RML), 2025 WL 3625900 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2025), the court denied defendant’s motion for reconsideration of the portion of the court’s December 15, 2025 Order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s retaliation claim asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Initially, the court held that plaintiff’s complaint contained sufficiently allegations of direct retaliatory animus:
In the Order, the Court concluded that the complaint’s allegations supported a reasonable inference “that plaintiff’s termination, for ‘unprofessional and confrontational behavior towards department supervisors,’ was caused by her numerous complaints concerning racial discrimination in the workplace, i.e., retaliatory animus.” Order 20 (quoting Compl. ¶ 35, ECF No. 1). Defendant latches on to the Court’s observation that plaintiff’s allegation concerning her termination letter supported a reasonable inference of retaliatory animus and argues that this conclusion amounts to clear error because “[i]t takes a logical leap for one to speculate” that the statement in plaintiff’s termination letter “about unprofessional and confrontational behavior referred in any way to [p]laintiff’s alleged … protected activity.” Mot. 9–10. Defendant further argues that “[t]his speculation is not supported by any facts in the [c]omplaint,” and “[t]he fact that it requires speculation or an inference to connect the dots means that it is not direct evidence.” Mot. 10 (emphasis in original).
This argument plainly fails to warrant reconsideration. At the outset, defendant misconstrues the necessary showing for a Title VII retaliation claim at the pleading stage. As the Second Circuit has explained, “the burden for establishing a prima facie case of retaliation is de minimis[.]” Duplan v. City of New York, 888 F.3d 612, 626 (2d Cir. 2018); see Farmers v. Shake Shack Enters., 473 F. Supp. 3d 309, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“At the motion to dismiss stage, however, a plaintiff is not required to plead a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas [Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)] to defeat a motion to dismiss. Instead, the facts alleged must give plausible support to the reduced requirements that arise under McDonnell Douglas in the initial phase of a Title VII litigation.” (first quoting Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 84 (2d Cir. 2015); and then quoting Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 2015)). And, of course, a plaintiff need not prove her theory at the pleading stage to defeat a motion to dismiss. See Sanabria v. Tezlof, No. 11-cv-06578, 2016 WL 4371750, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2016) (“[A]t the motion to dismiss stage, [p]laintiff need not present evidence in order for h[er] claims to survive.”).
Instead, a plaintiff simply must allege facts giving rise to a reasonable inference “that the protected activity was a but-for cause of the retaliation.” Order 19 (quoting Vega, 801 F.3d at 90–91); see also Altieri v. Albany Pub. Library, 172 F. App’x 331, 333 (2d Cir. 2006) (summary order) (“At the pleading stage, we consider only whether the factual predicate that is pleaded includes unlawful discrimination among the realm of plausible possibilities.”). And where temporal proximity may be lacking, a plaintiff can support this inference by alleging facts “supporting direct retaliatory animus.” Canady v. Univ. of Rochester Strong Mem’l Med. Ctr., No. 21-2150, 2022 WL 17825332, at *2 (2d Cir. Dec. 21, 2022) (summary order). Thus, here, the question is whether plaintiff has alleged facts that support a reasonable inference that defendant’s reference to plaintiff’s “unprofessional and confrontational” conduct was in fact reference to her protected activity of repeatedly complaining of discrimination to her employer.
As set forth in the Order, the complaint includes such facts here. Plaintiff alleges that she was “known to be hardworking, always on time, and for very rarely missing work.” Order 2 (quoting Compl. ¶ 19). Plaintiff alleges that this changed only when she experienced, and complained about, racial discrimination. See Order 2. The complaint sets forth a pattern in which plaintiff lodged complaints about racially discriminatory behavior to supervisors, those supervisors failed to take meaningful action, all of which culminated in defendant’s termination3 for, among other things, “unprofessional and confrontational behaviors towards department supervisors.” See Order 20. Moreover, against this backdrop, plaintiff expressly alleges that the termination letter’s reference to “unspecified unprofessional and confrontational behavior towards department supervisors … in actuality refer[red] to the fact that [p]laintiff complained of discrimination and was being retaliated against.”
The court concluded that, contrary to defendant’s argument, the inference that the statement about unprofessional and confrontational behaviors referred to plaintiff’s complaints about discrimination is supported by facts alleged in the complaint.