In White v. Harvard Security, LLC, No. 25-CV-0622, 2026 WL 1413549 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 2026), the court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s race-based hostile work environment claim asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
Title VII provides in relevant part that, “it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). Hostile work environment claims differ from other Title VII claims in that “[a] hostile work environment claim ‘is composed of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one “unlawful employment practice’ ” and ‘cannot be said to occur on any particular day.’ ” Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115–17 (2002)). That is, “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,’ that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment,’ Title VII is violated.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 116 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).
It is important to note, however, that “Title VII is not intended as a ‘general civility code,’ and requires that ‘conduct must be extreme’ to constitute the kind of ‘change in the terms and conditions of employment’ the statute was intended to target.” Burgess v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 642 F. App’x 152, 155 (3d Cir. 2016) (emphasis added) (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)). Thus, plaintiffs must meet an exacting standard.
To survive a motion to dismiss on a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, plaintiffs must plausibly allege that they have (1) “suffered intentional discrimination because of [a protected characteristic][;]” (2) “the discrimination was severe or pervasive[;]” (3) “the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff[;]” (4) “the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like circumstances[;]” and (5) “the existence of respondeat superior liability.” Mandel, 706 F.3d at 167 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted)). As relevant here, “[t]he ‘severe or pervasive’ standard is disjunctive and so ‘a plaintiff need not show that her hostile working environment was both severe and pervasive; only that it was sufficiently severe or sufficiently pervasive, or a sufficient combination of these elements, to have altered her working conditions.’ ” Moody v. Atl. City Bd. of Educ., 870 F.3d 206, 215 n.12 (3d Cir. 2017) (alteration added) (quoting Pucino v. Verizon Wireless Commc’ns, Inc., 618 F.3d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 2010)). District courts analyzing the plausibility of hostile work environment claims have been instructed by the Supreme Court to look at “all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787–88.
Upon review, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim. Apart from Plaintiff’s description of the broken entrance gate at the Jobsite, Plaintiff does plausibly allege that he suffered severe or pervasive discrimination on the basis of his race. Thus, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that he suffered discriminatory conduct that was either so frequent, or so severe, that it effectively altered the terms of Plaintiff’s employment with HPS. As Defendants point out, the Amended Complaint does not contain any allegations that Plaintiff was subjected to jokes, comments, or other statements by anyone at HPS regarding his race whatsoever. Plaintiff’s only allegation is that his reports were not addressed as quickly as another employee’s. See ECF No. 39 at 4–5. This is plainly insufficient to form the basis of a hostile work environment claim.
The court further noted that plaintiff’s amendments to his hostile work environment were insufficient, and dismissed his claim with prejudice.