In Blough v. BCD Travel USA, LLC, No. CV 23-1979, 2026 WL 1532946 (W.D. Pa. June 1, 2026), the court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s claim of gender-based hostile work environment asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
To establish a hostile work environment claim, Blough must show “that her workplace was ‘permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that [was] sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive working environment.’ ” Peace-Wickham v. Walls, 409 F. App’x 512, 519 (3d Cir. 2010) (Morgan, 536 U.S. at 116). “[O]ffhanded comments and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) are not sufficient to sustain a hostile work environment claim. Rather, the conduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment.” …
Plaintiff bases her hostile work environment claim on the manner in which BCD made account assignments, such as adding Menkes (who left in 2020) and Bratko (who was assigned to work on the Johnson & Johnson and Eli Lilly sales teams in 2019) and the comment made by Mr. Cruz at the work dinner in December 2019 when he embarrassed her by questioning her experience with public speaking when he said, “Do you even know how to speak in front of people?” ECF No. 76 at 5.
Again, timeliness is an issue. “[A] Title VII hostile work environment claim is timely if any of the acts in the pattern that comprises the hostile work environment occurred within the 300-day lookback period.” McClain v. Connellsville Sch. Dist., No. 2:20-CV-01485, 2021 WL 1737465, at *2 (W.D. Pa. May 3, 2021); see also O’Connor, 440 F.3d at 127 (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 105) (“[C]onsideration of the entire scope of a hostile work environment claim, including behavior alleged outside the statutory time period, is permissible for purposes of assessing liability, so long as any act contributing to that hostile environment takes place within the statutory time period.”). In this case, none of the purported acts occurred during the relevant time period, i.e., before August 17, 2021.
Even so, as for Mr. Cruz’s comment, even if there was evidence to support the inference that his question, as to whether Blough knew how to speak in front of people, was intentional discrimination based on her gender, the caselaw is clear that this does not suffice to establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to a hostile work environment claim. Offensive conduct or conduct that renders the employee’s work life unpleasant or uncomfortable is not enough. McClendon v. Dougherty, No. 2:10-CV-1339, 2011 WL 677481 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 2011). Likewise, “[a]llegations properly described as petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners do not suffice to establish an actionable hostile work environment.” Yarnall v. Philadelphia School Dist., 57 F. Supp. 3d 410, 433 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)).
With respect to the remaining hostile work environment theory, rather addressing BCD’s arguments or citing to case law or additional record evidence to show that the discriminatory manner in which BCD assigned its accounts over the years rose was so severe and persuasive as to create an abusive working environment, Blough instead argues that BCD’s motion should be denied because it is a factual issue for the jury to determine if that conduct detrimentally affected her under the reasonable person standard. ECF No. 76 at 14-15. She has provided no evidence that any of the business decisions as to the assignment of sales opportunities and accounts was based on her gender. And she is wrong that the issue is for the jury; in appropriate cases, courts have often held that a jury trial is not necessary when a defendant has met its burden on summary judgment in hostile work environment cases.
The court concluded that, taking all inferences in plaintiff’s favor, there was no genuine dispute of material fact for trial, and no reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiff suffered a hostile work environment during her employment. Accordingly, defendant was entitled to summary judgment.