In Thomasson v. State ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Nevada Sys. of Higher Educ., No. 3:25-CV-00611-MMD-CLB, 2026 WL 1346640 (D. Nev. May 13, 2026), the court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s hostile work environment claims asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
Defendant moves to dismiss the Title VII claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), primarily arguing that Thomasson fails to allege sufficient facts to state a plausible hostile work environment claim. (ECF No. 13 at 7.) Thomasson counters that the Complaint adequately pleads the necessary facts. (ECF No. 18 at 2-3.) The Court agrees with Defendant.
To survive a motion to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” a complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim” showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The Court then assesses whether the complaint contains sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citation omitted). A claim for relief is plausible when it contains either direct or inferential allegations concerning “all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562 (citation omitted).
Before addressing Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) argument, the Court notes that the Complaint fails to satisfy Rule 8(a)’s requirement of a “short and plain statement” showing entitlement to relief. A complaint must be “simple, concise, and direct” so that a defendant may understand what they are being sued for, but, here, the Complaint is overly vague, ambiguous, and conclusory. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409, 415 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding a Rule 8(a) dismissal where a complaint was confusing and conclusory). As noted, Thomasson appears to assert claims for retaliation, hostile work environment, and gender- and race-based discrimination, yet groups all allegations under a single cause of action entitled “Title VII Hostile Work Environment– Sex/Gender/Race/Retaliatory Hostility.” (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Thomasson, accordingly, fails to satisfy the Rule 8 standard.
Defendant argues that Thomasson fails to adequately state a claim of hostile work environment under Title VII because the Complaint, “despite its extraordinary length,” is full of “irrelevant” and “conclusory” allegations. (ECF No. 13 at 7-9.) To prevail on a hostile work environment claim on either race or sex under Title VII3, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that [s]he was subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a racial or sexual nature; (2) that the conduct was unwelcome; and (3) that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the plaintiff’s employment and create an abusive work environment.” Vasquez v. Cnty. of L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2003). “[W]hether an environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances,” and “no single factor is required.” Harris v. Forklift Syst., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (referencing factors such as “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance”) “Simple teasing,” “offhand comments,” and “isolated incidents” generally are insufficient to constitute hostility. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (explaining that Title VII is not a “general civility code”) (internal citation omitted).
Here, as Defendant notes, although Thomasson alleges a hostile work environment based on “sex/gender, race, and retaliatory hostility,” the Complaint is deficient because it fails to identify specific instances of “verbal or physical conduct of a racial or sexual nature.” (ECF No. 13 at 8.) Although the Complaint references preferential treatment allegedly afforded to “white male graduate students” (ECF No. 1 at 5), it does not plausibly allege conduct sufficiently “severe” or “pervasive” to support a hostile work environment claim based on race or gender. Moreover, the Complaint leaves the Court guessing as to whether Thomasson belongs to a protected racial class. And, to the extent the Complaint attempts to allege “retaliatory hostility” based upon protected activities, it fails to articulate any cogent theory regarding causation. (ECF No. 13 at 8.)
The Court thus finds the allegations conclusory and confusing and concludes that, taken alone, they do not plausibly allege Thomasson was subjected to conduct of a sexual or racial nature or a severe or pervasive environment altering the conditions of Thomasson’s employment, and therefore fail to state a claim. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion is granted because Thomasson fails to state a short and plain statement showing she is entitled to relief and fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim.
The court did, however, grant plaintiff leave to amend their complaint, finding that an amendment would not be futile.