In Brooks v. Bright Horizons Family Solutions, Inc., et al, No. 25-1830-CV, 2026 WL 1660493 (2d Cir. June 9, 2026), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a lower court decision, and held that plaintiff plausibly alleged race discrimination in the form of termination and failure to promote under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
From the decision:
Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to h[er] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). “[F]or a discrimination claim to survive a motion to dismiss, absent direct evidence of discrimination, what must be plausibly supported by facts alleged in the complaint is that the plaintiff (1) is a member of a protected class, (2) was qualified, (3) suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) has at least minimal support for the proposition that the employer was motivated by discriminatory intent.” Buon v. Spindler, 65 F.4th 64, 79 (2d Cir. 2023). Discrimination claims brought under § 1981 are generally analyzed under the same framework as Title VII claims. Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, N.Y., 375 F.3d 206, 225 (2d Cir. 2004).
a. Failure to Promote
The amended complaint plausibly alleges that Bright Horizons failed to promote Brooks because of her race. To demonstrate Bright Horizons’ discriminatory intent with respect to her failure to obtain a promotion, Brooks alleges that she was not selected for promotion despite being qualified, whereas her employer instead promoted a person outside her protected group who lacked a qualification required by the job listing—namely, prior supervisory experience. These facts “give plausible support to a minimal inference of discriminatory motivation.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 84 (2d Cir. 2015); see Buon, 65 F.4th at 83 (plaintiff met her “minimal burden” at the motion to dismiss stage by alleging that she was qualified for positions she sought and those positions were filled by individuals outside her protected class who were less qualified). Additionally, the amended complaint plausibly sets forth that Carrone treated her other supervisees who were not part of Brooks’ protected racial group—but were otherwise similarly situated—more favorably. For example, while Carrone micromanaged Brooks, demanding that she be copied on every email Brooks sent and be invited to every staff meeting Brooks held, Carrone did not impose these same requirements on other non-Black directors. It is well-established that “the more favorable treatment of employees not in the protected group” helps give rise to an inference of discrimination. Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 312 (2d Cir. 2015). Viewed in conjunction, these allegations suffice to present a plausible allegation of racial discrimination in the denial of a promotion.
b. Termination
The amended complaint also plausibly alleges that Brooks was fired because of her race. Principally, Brooks emphasizes that following her termination, her position was filled by a white woman. As we have held, “[t]he fact that a plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected class will ordinarily suffice for the required inference of discrimination at the initial prima facie stage of the Title VII analysis, including at the pleading stage.” Id. at 313. If that were not enough, Brooks also alleges that a white woman she supervised was the one who ultimately made the decision that violated Bright Horizons’ COVID-19 protocol and led to Brooks’ termination. Despite her role in this decision-making process, the white director was “neither investigated nor penalized in any way for her own decision,” Joint App’x 69, suggesting “the more favorable treatment of employees not in the protected group,” Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 312. As explained above, these allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
Based on this, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s Title VII and § 1981 racial discrimination claims based on her termination, as well as its dismissal of Brooks’ § 1981 racial discrimination claim derived from Bright Horizons’ failure to promote her.