In Sebastiani v. Brooklyn Hospital Center, No. 19-CV-253 (EK)(ST), 2026 WL 2031501 (E.D.N.Y. July 14, 2026), the court, inter alia, denied defendants’ motion for reconsideration of the lower court’s decision that plaintiff presented enough evidence to survive summary judgment on their hostile work environment claims asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law.
In sum, plaintiff alleges that his ex-girlfriend, Pik Lee, harassed him both outside of work and while on the clock at Brooklyn Hospital Center.
Initially, the court held that a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether Lee created a hostile work environment under Title VII:
Defendants’ primary argument in support of reconsideration is that Lee’s alleged groping of Sebastiani was an “aberrational act by a non-employee” for which the hospital should not be held liable. Hospital Defs.’ Br. 3. More specifically, they assert that being “touched once by a former lover [and non-supervisor] after a breakup” is insufficient to create a hostile work environment. Hospital Defs.’ Reply 3, ECF No. 196; cf. Lee’s Reply 4-6, ECF No. 195 (raising similar argument in the context of the NYSHRL). This argument fails.
First, the case law makes clear that a single groping incident can give rise to a hostile work environment. “Direct contact with an intimate body part constitutes one of the most severe forms of sexual harassment.” Redd v. New York Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166, 177 (2d Cir. 2012).2 The hospital defendants attempt to distinguish the cases cited in the Order for this proposition on the basis that they involved harassment by supervisors rather than colleagues. Hospital Defs.’ Br. 3-5. This argument conflates two questions: (a) whether a single incident can suffice, and (b) whether (and when) a non-supervisor’s conduct may be imputed to the employer. We discuss (b) in more detail below, but the defendants are simply incorrect as to both parts. Among the cases cited in the Order is Conlan v. Liberty Mut. Grp., Inc., No. 23-CV-8947, 2024 WL 4792112 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2024). That decision collected a number of district-court orders in support of the assertion that “intentionally touching or grabbing a co-worker’s genitals or intimate parts [on one occasion] was sufficiently severe” to create a hostile work environment. Id. at *5 (emphasis added). That is what precisely Sebastiani alleges occurred here.
Second, the evidence adduced would not actually require a reasonable jury to conclude that the groping incident was “aberrational” (even if that was a defense). See Hospital Defs.’ Br. 3. For example, as detailed in the Court’s prior order, Sebastiani testified that Lee had been making threats to his career and life — like those she made while touching his genitals — for quite some time. See Order 3-4. Again, as we previously acknowledged, some — or even much — of this harassment may be plausibly attributed to Lee’s displeasure at their breakup. See id. at 11. But that conduct still provides context for the groping incident — it was part of a pattern of threatening behavior, rather than a complete one-off.
Indeed, the groping incident could provide some basis for a jury to infer that other allegedly harassing behavior by Lee was motivated by sex (at least in part). See Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 378 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Facially neutral incidents may be included, of course, among the totality of the circumstances that courts consider in any hostile work environment claim, so long as a reasonable fact-finder could conclude [based on circumstantial evidence] that they were, in fact, based on sex.”); see also Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Reg’l Transp. Auth., 743 F.3d 11, 23 (2d Cir. 2014) (a plaintiff bringing a hostile work environment claim need not “demonstrate that [a protected characteristic] was the only motivating factor” behind the harassment (emphasis added)); Redd, 678 F.3d at 178 (“[W]hen, as is often the case in sexual harassment claims, fact questions such as state of mind or intent are at issue, summary judgment should be used sparingly.”).3
Finally, defendants argue that Sebastiani has not adduced facts sufficient to create a material dispute regarding whether the harassment was “subjectively … perceived by [him] to be, sufficiently hostile to alter the conditions of employment for the worse.” Schiano v. Quality Payroll Sys., Inc., 445 F.3d 597, 604 (2d Cir. 2006); see, e.g., Hospital Defs.’ Reply 1. But Sebastiani testified that he complained to Dym about the groping incident, as the Order indicates, and the Second Circuit has treated a plaintiff’s complaints about harassment as sufficient evidence that he “subjectively experienced a hostile work environment.”
The court held that since plaintiff’s Title VII claim survives, so too does his NYSHRL hostile work environment claim, which is governed by the same framework as Title VII.
It also found a sufficient basis for imputing the conduct to the hospital under Title VII and the NYSHRL, as well as under the NYCHRL (finding that a reasonable jury may infer that plaintiff’s supervisor “tacitly accepted” the sexual harassment of plaintiff).